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Abstract 
Currency convertibility and monetary integration activities of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) are directed at addressing the problems of multiple currencies 
and exchange rate changes that are perceived as stumbling blocks to regional integration. A 
real exchange rate (RER) variability model shows that ECOWAS is closer to a monetary 
union now than before. As expected, the implementation of structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) by various governments in the subregion has brought about a reasonable level of 
convergence. However, wide differences still exist between RER shocks facing CFA zone 
and non-CFA zone West African countries. Further convergence in economic policy and 
alternatives to dependence on revenues from taxes on international transactions are required 
for a stable region-wide monetary union in West Africa. 
1. Introduction and the problem 
Regional integration, perceived as one means for eradicating mass poverty among the peoples of 16 West African countries, has been the goal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). They plan to achieve this goal 
through regional trade liberalization. To this end, various activities such as preferential 
treatment of intra-regional trade, transport and communication projects, and monetary 
integration, among others, are slated for implementation. These activities, spanning a 
quarter of a century, have recorded limited progress, as intra-regional trade is still very 
low. Various evaluations of the movement towards regional integration have identified 
conceptual as well as implementation problems. 
The periodic review of the activities of the regional body has culminated in the revision 
of the original treaty to address some of the problems that have arisen. Indeed, the revised 
treaty is an indication of the willingness of the regional body to forge ahead with the 
objective of achieving regional integration. The old provisions on cooperation in monetary 
and financial matters, that is, chapter four of the original treaty, were limited to the 
harmonization of economic and fiscal policies, the maintenance of balance of payments 
equilibrium, and the examination of developments in the economies of member states. 
The old treaty also proposed the establishment of bilateral and multilateral payments 
systems, a committee of West African central banks, and a Capital Issue Committee to 
oversee free flow of capital between member states. 
The revised treaty strengthened and deepened the provision for monetary integration 
in the subregion. Indeed, it gave new impetus to the monetary integration efforts of the 
regional body and is a bold move towards monetary union. While the provisions in the 
original treaty can be regarded as mere statements of intention, as they lack definite steps 
towards implementation, the revised treaty states clearly the stages and steps towards the 
establishment of an ECOWAS monetary union. 
A practical step in the establishment of a monetary union since 1975 was the 
establishment of the West African Clearing House (WACH), which subsequently became 
West African Monetary Agency (WAMA). Other efforts in the area of insurance, money 
and capital markets are clear steps towards monetary integration in the region. 
This study contributes to the current efforts to establish a single monetary zone in the 
region by examining economic pre-conditions for a viable regional monetary union in 
West Africa. To what extent are these conditions being met by the member states? How 
can member states achieve the pre-conditions for the various stages of a single monetary 
zone in the subregion? These are some of the issues explored in this study. 
Recently,1 the Community was in search of consultants to draft the protocol on a 
single currency monetary zone. The belief seems to be that member states have taken 
1 
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measures within the context of their national structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
to facilitate the establishment of a single monetary zone in the subregion. Even if this is 
true, there seems to be a lack of coordination and harmonization among the members' 
policies. It is indeed necessary to evaluate the individual countries' efforts not in terms 
of the impact of SAPs, but as they relate to the requirements for the establishment of a 
single monetary zone in the subregion. 
The desirability of monetary integration in West Africa has been expressed not only 
by ECOWAS in the articles and protocols of the Community, but also by various 
researchers such as Soyibo (1998), Taylor (1994), and McLenaghan et al. (1982). Some 
outstanding conceptualization problems that impinge on the establishment of an effective 
monetary union in the subregion dominate the discussions in the literature. For example, 
there are divergent views about the timing and sequencing of activities leading to the 
establishment of a monetary union in the subregion. Taylor (1994) suggests that the 
transition from multiple currencies to a union currency should be very short so as to 
avoid possible confusion and the temptation to revert to independent action. McLenaghan 
et al. (1982) and Soyibo (1998), however, and on the basis of experiences of other regional 
bodies with monetary union and the fact that reforms do take time to implement, call for 
a more gradual approach. The balance of opinion is that for an enduring monetary union, 
a gradual approach is favoured. More importantly, effective monetary integration calls 
for some reforms, which usually take some time. 
Objectives of the study 
Various studies on the performance of ECOWAS have pointed to lack of monetary integration as one of the factors responsible for the low intra-regional trade in the 
subregion (Taylor, 1994; Ogunkola, 1998; Jebuni et al., 1999). Yet, studies on monetary 
integration in the subregion are scanty. This study focuses on the prospects of a viable 
monetary union in the subregion and the role of monetary integration in the facilitation 
and enhancement of payments for intra-regional trade. 
Specifically, the main objective of this study is to determine the viability of an 
ECOWAS monetary union. Other objectives are to review the current levels of 
development (especially the implementation of reforms) in the economies of West African 
countries and their suitability for the establishment of a monetary union in the subregion, 
and to analyse the costs and benefits of monetary union in ECOWAS. The study also 
offers suggestions on necessary reforms for the establishment of an effective monetary 
union in the region. 
Justification for the study 
Payments for international transactions necessarily involve exchange of currencies, hence the different types of risks such as credit/payment risk and exchange rate risk. 
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The costs and ease with which international transactions are executed depend on the 
acceptability of the different currencies. Monetary integration becomes important in 
international economic relations especially in addressing the problems of the multiplicity 
of currencies and exchange rate regimes that often hinder trade flows between countries, 
[t is obvious that importers will prefer goods and services from a country with less 
cumbersome payments systems devoid of exchange rate risk. This is more so with the 
current wave of globalization. While various instruments such as bills of exchange, letters 
of credit, etc., have been designed and are widely used to minimize both credit and 
payment risks, monetary integration is most suitable for addressing currency convertibility 
and exchange rate risk. Indeed, monetary integration, by promoting policy stability, 
promotes economic growth. 
Lack of currency convertibility contributes to the high cost of transactions in the 
subregion as it costs money (and time and other resources) to exchange one currency for 
another. This is compounded by the international payments system in ECOWAS, which 
is unnecessarily cumbersome. Indeed, it has been reported that payments for intra-regional 
goods and services often pass through convertible currencies. Thus, payment for West 
African goods and services may pass through the European Union or the United States 
of America mainly because of the convertibility of their currencies. More importantly, 
traders pay multiple costs in terms of commissions and charges. 
Exchange rate variability constitutes another set of risks to intra-regional trade. Even 
when currencies are convertible, the exchange rate policies of the countries in the region 
are neither stable nor predictable. Indeed, exchange rate control and other international 
payment restrictions implicitly promote unrecorded trans-border trade (UTT), which is 
rampant in the subregion. An over-valued exchange rate makes it possible for smugglers 
lo earn more in local currency from a given amount of foreign exchange and to earn 
scarce foreign exchange, which further promotes UTT. Over-valued exchange rates reduce 
the price and income of domestic producers and hence discourage local production (Taylor, 
1994). Put differently, over-valued exchange rates lead to misallocation of resources. 
It can be argued that both convertibility and realistic exchange rates derivable from a 
monetary zone will not significantly affect the level of intra-regional trade, as other 
factors limit regional flows of goods and services in the region. However, a monetary 
zone is capable of fostering economic growth and of reducing the need for adjustment. 
Guaranteed convertibility and predictable exchange rates are indicators of a stable 
investment climate. The response of both foreign and domestic investors to such 
developments would definitely stimulate growth. A monetary zone also instils monetary 
and fiscal discipline in the participating members. On the basis of the experience of the 
CFA zone in West Africa, Devarajan and de Melo (1986) submit that it is generally 
agreed that membership of the zone has been beneficial because it has reduced instability, 
encouraged resource allocation and led to fewer distortionary policies to correct macro 
imbalances. This study examines the prospects of a monetary zone in the subregion from 
the basis of the effects of monetary integration on trade and economic development. 
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Organization of the study 
The rest of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 examines some characteristics of the economies in West Africa and describes the current state of activities towards 
establishing a monetary union in the subregion. Issues in monetary integration such as 
the stages or types of monetary integration, and the costs and benefits of various forms 
of monetary integration are the preoccupation of Section 3. Also discussed in the section 
are the theoretical as well as empirical issues. Section 4 is on the RER model. Monthly 
and quarterly models were estimated and the results analysed in this section. Section 5 
briefly examines the costs and benefits of an ECOWAS monetary union. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. ECOWAS and a single monetary zone 
in West Africa 
Table 1 presents some of the characteristics of the economies in the region. First, the multiplicity of currencies and the levels of economic activity suggest that harmonization of policies is capable of promoting recorded intra-regional trade 
Hows. There are ten different currencies circulating in the West Africa subregion (see 
Table 1). The CFA franc, which circulates among the seven Union Economique et 
Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) members in the region, bears a fixed exchange 
rate with the euro to which it was pegged at the rate of CFAF655.957 per euro. The CFA 
franc is fully convertible within the French franc zone. The United States dollar is legal 
tender in Liberia, while other currencies in the region are managed by different exchange 
rate policies. 
Some characteristics of West African economies 
wo groups of countries are distinguishable in the region: the CFA zone countries 
and those outside the CFA zone. These groups differ in many respects; the CFA 
zone countries are more integrated culturally (French language and culture) and in terms 
of policy. More importantly, they operate within a monetary union. Evidence suggests 
superior performance of this group of countries over other West African countries, which 
has been attributed to the effectiveness of their monetary union (Guillaumont et al., 1988; 
Medhora, 1990; Devarajan and de Melo, 1986). Currently available data reveal that CFA 
zone countries recorded an average real GDP growth rate of about 5% between 1994 and 
1998, a rate higher than that of the non-CFA zone countries. 
The production structure of the economies of ECOWAS provides a rough indicator 
of product diversification and suggests that the economies of the West African states are 
not highly diversified. These countries produce similar tropical agricultural products and 
there are only minor differences in their structures of production (Table 1). The share of 
agricultural production varied from 13% (Cape Verde) to 46% (Ghana) in 1980, while in 
1995, the corresponding range was between 12% (Cape Verde) and 50% (Mali). The 
share of industrial production in total production remains low, averaging 21% and 19% 
in 1980 and 1995, respectively. The share of manufacturing production was about 47% 
(i.e., less than 10% of total production) of the industrial production. 
Services exert significant influence in the production structure of these economies. 
The share of services in total production for the two periods, 1980 and 1995, was 47%. 
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Table 1: Some characteristics of economies of West Africa 
Country 
Sen/ices Currency 
USS) 
Dollclt-GDP 
ratio 
USS) 
Dob—GDP 
ratio 
Inflation 
Gross domestic Products 
(1985 constant prices) 
Avorago growth 
rates Exports 
(million 
Imports 
(million 
Degroo 
01 
openness 
Seigniorage 
(MB) |M.1g) 
Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry 
1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1985 1995 1980-85 1935.95 1985 1985 1985 1981-86 1990-91 1980 1985 
Benin CFAF -4.2 -3.2 0.267 0.807 na na 805 1046 1364 
Burkina F. CFAF -7.6 -1.9 0.153 0.511 na 6.9 1246 1476 1895 
Cape Verde Escudo -8 12.9 0 0.389 na 8 76 107 164 
Escudo -8 12.9 0 0.389 na 8 76 107 164 
Coted'lv. CFAF -12.8 -3.7 0.686 1.941 14.18 12.5 6705 6978 7993 
Gambia Dalasi -10.7 -3.3 0.856 1.053 6.12 6.5 163 218 266 
Ghana Cedi -11.7 -6.4 0.33 0.95 33.33 37.5 4602 4504 7094 
Guinea Franc -0.5 -2.8 0.385 0.826 na na 2654 2529 3850 
Guinea B. Peso 12.2 -1.4 2.997 3.371 na 31.2 223 247 380 
Liberia Dollar -14.5 -15.1 0.429 16.076 12.79 na 1147 1055 1126 
Mali CFAF -14.3 -3.3 0.352 0.962 na 11.8 1287 1242 1738 
Mauritania 
Ouguy -13.7 1.1 na na na na 686 683 972 
Niger CFAF -1 -0.7 0.232 0.846 9.35 9.6 1479 1440 1645 
Nigeria Naira -3.4 3.5 0.289 1.136 10 42.1 84000 80955 119903 
Senegal CFAF -8.2 -0.2 0.4 0.769 14.74 2.5 2223 2579 3215 
Sierra Leo. Leone -12.1 -6.3 0.516 1.249 0 20.6 1035 1199 969 
Togo CFAF -5.7 -6.4 0.831 1.107 11.01 14.1 776 753 831 
Total n/a 109107 107011 153405 
Average n/a 6819.19 6688.19 9587.81 
5.99 3.04 150 331 0.46 -2.4 2.7 0.27 0.14(0.85 0.059 0.37 0.17(0.60) 0.46 
3.69 2.84 71 332 0.27 1 -0.1 0.35 0.27(0.63) 0.38 0.35 0.18(0.59) 0.47 
8.16 5.33 6 84 0.84 na na 0.13 0.17(0.31) 0.69 0.12 0.14(0.26) 0.74 
8.16 5.33 6 84 0.84 na na 0.13 0.17(0.31) 0.69 0.12 0.14(0.26) 0.74 
0.81 1.45 3198 1749 0.71 1.1 0.4 0.35 0.15(0.56) 0.5 0.31 0.17(0.59) 0.52 
6.75 2.2 43 93 0.62 1.8 1.8 0.31 0.10(0.59) 0.58 0.19 0.11(0.61) 0.71 
-0.43 5.75 617 731 0.3 3.3 0.4 0.46 0.21(0.68) 0.33 0.36 0.19(0.60) 0.45 
-0.94 5.22 493 420 0.36 na na 0.24 0.35(0.14) 0.4 0.23 0.34(0.11) 0.43 
2.15 5.38 12 60 0.29 na na 0.32 0.11(0.96) 0.57 0.48 0.07(0.64) 0.45 
-1.60 0.67 436 287 0.69 na na 0.38 0.30(0.22) 0.31 0.4 0.18(0.48) 0.42 
-0.70 3.99 124 299 0.34 1.7 -0.6 0.44 0.10(0.47) 0.47 0.5 0.14(0.47) 0.36 
-0.09 4.23 374 234 0.89 1.7 1.1 0.24 0.25(0.30) 0.52 0.24 0.31(0.27) 0.45 
-0.53 1.42 259 369 0.44 0.6 -0.7 0.38 0.21(0.31) 0.41 0.46 0.18(0.40) 0.36 
-0.73 4.81 12548 8877 0.26 1.1 2.9 0.33 0.38(0.24) 0.29 0.36 0.25(0.28) 0.4 
3.2 2.47 562 826 0.54 1 -0.8 0.2 0.17(0.70) 0.64 0.19 0.20(0.71) 0.61 
3.17 -1.92 130 151 0.23 6.2 6.2 0.45 0.18(0.27) 0.37 0.53 0.17(0,33) 0.3 
-0.59 1.04 190 288 0.63 1.9 1.4 0.26 0.24(0.30) 0.5 0.37 0.17(0.33) 0.4 
n/a n/a 19213 15131 n/a n/a n/a 
1.77 3 1200.81 945.69 0.49 n/a n/a 0.32 0.21(0.47) 0.47 0.34 0.19(0.46) 0.47 
Notes: na means riot available and n/a means not applicable. Seigniorage is defined as government revenue obtained through the exclusive privilege of printing money 
expressed as percentage of GDP. Seigniorage of more than 2% of GDP is not desirable as it is a precursor of inflation. Seigniorage of more than 3% for several years 
indicates large macroeconomic imbalances. 
Sources: African Development Bank (1997); World Bank (1994) (for seigniorage); (3) Telia and Adesoye (1998J. 
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More importantly, recent trends in the production structure point to the emerging 
importance of the service sector especially tourism. Major tourist destinations are Ghana, 
Senegal and Cote d'lvoire. 
The poor performance of CFA zone countries after 1981 was attributed to changes in 
the world economy, persistent current account deficits and the inability of these economies 
to adjust. Indeed, the growth performance of the CFA zone West African economies did 
not improve until after the 1994 devaluation of the CFAF. This slow or negative growth 
in per capita GDP of the CFA zone countries was attributed to worsening balance of 
payments, debt crises, declining competitiveness and, more importantly, an apparent failure 
to adjust to the changes in their environment (Devarajan and de Melo, 1990). 
Over the years, the structure of the West African economies has not changed 
significantly. A few countries in the region dominate: Nigeria, Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, 
Senegal and Guinea. These countries accounted for about 90% of the total GDP of the 
region in 1995 (see Table 1). The growth rates of the economies in West Africa have not 
shown any significant convergence over the years. Figure 1, based on the concept of F-
convergence, reveals non-convergence in both the CFA and non-CFA zones of West 
Africa. This is not far from a priori expectations, as developments in these economies 
(both CFA and non-CFA countries) were influenced by different factors. It is noted that 
some countries in this region depend on raw agricultural output for foreign exchange and 
some on mineral (especially petroleum products) exports. 
Figure 1: STANDARD DEVIATION OF LOG PER CAPITA INCOME OF ECOWAS, 1967 T01995 
J N i 
1967 19S3 1959 1970 197! 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1973 1973 1930 1&31 1932 5H3 19M IS35 1SS5 1597 19J3 1?S3 1950 1991 1K2 193 1994 1595 
The recorded intra-regional trade of the subregion, though increasing, is still negligible 
and does not fully reflect the over 25 years of efforts directed at regional 
integration(Ogunkola, 1998). Given that the estimated potential trade in the subregion is 
a multiple of the currently observed intra-regional trade, and coupled with considerable 
unrecorded regional trans-border trade, monetary integration in the subregion has the 
potential to increase recorded intra-regional trade. The current attraction of the subregion's 
exports to the developed countries may be due to convertibility of developed countries' 
currencies as well as to the complementarity of commodities of the region. 
The share of intra-ECOWAS trade in total trade has remained below 10% over the 
years, with great disparity along subregional groupings. Table 1 suggests that most 
UEMOA members trade more with West African countries than did other ECOWAS 
members. Indeed, the shares of these members of UEMOA have generally increased. 
For example, Benin's share increased from 15.01% in 1988 to 33.86% in 1993; Cote 
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d'lvoire's from 18.83% in 1988 to 26.88% in 1993, Senegal's from 12.02% to 21.25%, 
and Togo's from 12.39% to 24.5%. Can this pattern be attributed to the existence of a 
single currency among these countries? At present, intra-regional traders in the subregion 
convert local currencies for internationally convertible currencies before changing them 
to the local currency of the trading partner. In this case, the traders pay commissions at 
least twice on each transaction. 
Benefits derivable from monetary union in the West Africa subregion include the 
reduction in transaction costs, a stable and predictable macroeconomic environment, 
and increased intra-regional trade. On the cost side, the loss of the use of monetary 
policy is not likely to be a major constraint as these countries use this policy sparingly 
(Taylor, 1994). Of course, the use of the policy varies across the countries in the subregion; 
hence a detailed analysis is required to ascertain the effect of losing this instrument to the 
regional body. The ability of government to obtain revenue from its exclusive right of 
printing money, seigniorage, is also to be given up to the regional body. The last column 
in Table 1, based on the World Bank (1994) calculations and assumptions, suggests that 
seigniorage has reduced in most countries. While this is a good omen for the establishment 
of a monetary union, its distribution among members is an important factor in ensuring a 
viable monetary union. 
The concentration of these economies in the production of tropical agricultural products 
has implications for the formation of a monetary union in the subregion. When the degree 
of product diversification is high, changes in the terms of trade and in the national exchange 
rates will be minimized. As the degree of product diversification of these economics 
may not be high, the stability of a monetary union in the subregion is likely to be affected. 
Finally, the degree of openness of these economies, defined as the share of exports 
plus imports in GDP, averaged 49% and varied between 23% in Sierra Leone and 84% in 
Cape Verde in 1995. The more open an economy is, the less effective an arrangement of 
flexible exchange rates becomes as a control and mechanism for external balance. 
ECOWAS efforts in monetary integration 
The main focus of the examination in this section is on provisions relating to monetary integration and the activities of the institutions responsible for promoting monetary 
union in the region. Other complementary efforts are also mentioned. 
The revised Treaty expanded and broadened the scope of cooperation in monetary 
and financial matters to include the establishment of a monetary union. The following 
main steps are identified: 
• Harmonization of monetary, financial and payment policies. 
• Introduction of limited convertibility of currencies towards facilitating the 
liberalization of intra-regional payments transactions. 
• Promotion of the role of commercial banks in the intra-community trade financing. 
• Introduction of a credit and guarantee fund mechanism to improve the multilateral 
system of clearing payments transactions between member states. 
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. Promotion of activities of the West African Monetary Agency towards ensuring 
convertibility of currencies and creation of a single monetary zone. 
• Establishment of a Community Central Bank and a common currency zone. 
Apart from a detailed listing of the process of a monetary union, an ECOWAS monetary 
cooperation programme (EMCP) was established to coordinate the activities leading to 
the establishment of a single monetary zone in West Africa. Theoriginal timetable for the 
union put the completion date at 2005. The first ten years (from 1990 to 1999) would 
witness the establishment of a custom union. Thereafter, the next five years (from 2000 
to 2004) would be devoted to the establishment of an economic and monetary union. 
Thus, the Community was expected to achieve the status of economic and monetary 
union by 2005. 
The EMCP was designed in three phases, with the first phase geared towards clearing 
arrears in the WACH and introducing new payment instruments such as ECOWAS 
travellers cheques and bills of exchange. A credit guarantee mechanism was to be 
established in this phase. Other activities in the first phase are the transformation of 
WACH into a specialized monetary agency of ECOWAS and the removal of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) to payments, trade and investments. 
Similarly, the last two phases were designed to achieve medium- to long-term measures 
such as exchange rate realignment and harmonization, adoption of an ECOWAS exchange 
rate system with a central parity and margin of fluctuation, maintenance of fiscal discipline, 
and adoption of a market-oriented approach to monetary policy. 
The examination of these measures reveals that almost all the members of ECOWAS 
have implemented exchange rate adjustment policies and realized reduction in the gaps 
between the official and parallel market exchange rates. This rather high level of 
achievement was due to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
rather than compliance with the agreed implementation schedules of EMCP measures. 
Other EMCP measures such as a credit ceiling to government by the respective central 
banks, current and capital account liberalization, and interest rate deregulation are also 
integral parts of country-specific SAPs that have also witnessed a relatively high level of 
implementation. It is noted that measures relating exclusively to the regional body's 
integration scheme have not reached a similar level of implementation, if they have been 
implemented at all. Measures in this category are removal of NTBs, which has been 
implemented by only two members, and ratification of the WAMA protocol, which was 
also done by only two members (or by 12.5% of members). 
The West African Monetary Agency was established to promote the use of national 
currencies in intra-regional trade and to promote savings in the use of member states' 
foreign exchange reserves. The agency was also meant to promote trade liberalization 
and monetary cooperation among members. The intensification in the use of national 
currencies of members, as well as saving foreign exchange reserves of members, was to 
be achieved through a clearing and settlement mechanism. 
The level of transactions passing through the agency has fluctuated over the years. In 
value terms, the level rose gradually from about 18.28 million WAUA in 1976 to a peak 
of about 233.64 million WAUA in 1983. By 1984 the level of transactions was half that 
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of the preceding year; the decline continued, and by 1990 it was about 14 million W All A 
Except for 1994 and 1995, when the transactions rose to about 78.23 million WAUA and 
93.73 million WAUA, respectively, the level of transactions passing through the agency 
remained very low. Indeed, since 1995 it has remained under 5 million WAUA. The 
fluctuation in the value of transactions passing through WAMA indirectly reflects the 
exchange rate regimes in the subregion. It can be noted that when transactions throu»h 
WAMA were high, high foreign exchange restrictions were in place. The liberalized era 
of foreign exchange is reflected in the low volume of transaction. Is the Agency relevant 
in a liberalized foreign exchange regime? 
The volume of intra-regional transactions passing through WAMA bears an indirect 
relationship to exchange control measures and fixed exchange rate regimes of the member 
countries. Hence, the general decline in the volume of intra-regional transactions passing 
through WAMA is largely a reflection of the liberalization of foreign exchange markets 
in these countries. The slight recovery in the transactions in 1994 and 1995 was due 
mainly to the introduction of controls in Nigeria in 1994 and the devaluation of the CTA 
Franc in 1994, which resulted in the increase in transactions between Nigeria and CTA 
zone countries (WAMA, 1999). 
Even when intra-regional trade is routed through the Agency, settlement of transactions 
in hard currencies rather than clearing of net balances dominates. The share of the amount 
that was cleared out of the total transactions passing through the Agency remained very 
low, between 2.83% and 38.95% during 1976-1998 (see Table 2). Settlement generally 
required the use of foreign exchange, hence the Agency was not effective in promoting 
the use of national currencies as well as saving foreign exchange of member states. 
The volume of the transactions passing through the Agency is not an indication of the 
level of intra-regional trade in the subregion. Such trade (exports and imports) has been 
increasing except for minor fluctuations (see Table 2). It rose from about $0,378 million 
in 1976 to about $5.3 million in 1997. The share of transactions passing through the 
Agency was never up to 25%. In fact, apart from 1980, 1983 and 1984 when the share 
was more than 20%, the share of intra-regional trade passing through the Agency was 
below 20%. This suggests that the Agency was not attractive to intra-regional traders. 
No doubt the performance of the Agency has been below expectation and this has 
necessitated a review of its operations to make it more relevant for regional integration 
of the region. The Committee of Governors of member central banks in 1998 set up a 
committee for this purpose. The committee's findings pointed to known factors such as 
lack of complementarity in production and low rate of industrialization, just to mention 
a few. The effect of structural adjustment programmes implemented by members, which 
has led to the deregulation of the external sector, the devaluation of most currencies and 
the increase in access to foreign exchange, makes the use of the clearing system very 
unattractive (WAMA, 1999: 10). 
Various efforts to improve the payment system in ECOWAS are under way. First. 
WAMA is to be revamped to cope with the changing economic environment and to he 
more effective in achieving its goals. 
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Table 2: Transactions through West African Monetary Agency, 1976-1998 
Clearing as Intra- Clearing 
Transactions Clearing % of 
transaction 
ECOWAS 
trade 
Clearing as % of 
trade 
Million 
WAUA 
Million 
WAUA 
% 000 US $ 000 US $ % 
1976 18.28 4.30 23.52 884.00 47.60 5.40 
1977 45.45 13.40 29.48 1291.00 117.60 9.10 
1978 52.40 14.22 27.14 1355.00 135.60 10.00 
1979 71.96 17.79 24.72 1494.00 186.00 12.40 
1980 141.22 23.79 16.85 1649.00 368.00 22.30 
1981 162.42 32.14 19.79 2371.00 384.00 16.20 
1982 133.85 19.90 14.87 2311.00 296.00 12.80 
19S3 205.51 15.68 7.63 1974.00 440.00 22.30 
1984 233.46 17.51 7.50 1957.00 480.00 24.50 
1985 128.38 16.79 13.08 2064.00 260.00 12.60 
1986 89.78 11.97 13.33 1828.00 210.00 11.50 
1987 56.69 3.11 5.49 2297.00 146.00 6.40 
1988 24.52 9.55 38.95 2307.00 66.00 2.90 
1989 20.24 5.44 26.88 2308.00 52.00 2.30 
1990 14.04 2.96 21.08 3438.00 38.00 1.10 
1991 16.07 2.92 18.17 3255.00 44.00 1.40 
1992 16.97 2.83 16.68 3566.00 48.00 1.30 
1993 22.92 2.15 9.38 4142.00 64.00 1.50 
1994 78.23 2.21 2.83 3940.00 224.00 5.70 
1995 93.73 19.11 20.39 3995.00 284.00 7.10 
1996 4.51 0.56 12.42 4718.00 12.20 0.30 
1997 2.97 0.39 13.13 5305.00 8.20 0.20 
Source: WAMA (1999). 
Second, there is a proposal on the establishment of a West African inter-bank payment 
system (WAIPS) by commercial and merchant banks in the region. WAIPS, according 
to WABA (1999), is to focus on trade, payments and transfers across the subregion. 
WAIPS is to improve the efficiency in fund transmission at the lowest cost. Apart from 
settling the net debit position of participating banks in hard currency (which is expected 
to be very low) through the various central banks, WAIPS will be owned by West African 
banks, and will not need central banks' financial intervention. 
Other complementary efforts include the ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme and 
the free movement of persons. Recently, a regional development plan aiming at ensuring 
complementarity between economic policies of the regional body and individual member 
states is being developed. It is meant to address harmonization of economic policies, 
trade and investment policies, and infrastructural development, among others. The lack 
of coordination and harmonization of SAP-induced policies adopted by different members 
was the main reason for the proposed plan
3. Issues in monetary integration 
There are various phases of monetary integration, ranging from limited currency convertibility to single common currency (monetary union). While a permanently fixed exchange rate is the core of a monetary union, higher forms of monetary 
integration involve integration of economic policies, a common pool of reserves and a 
single central bank. The lowest form of economic union is an arrangement of limited 
currency convertibility, while the highest form of monetary integration is the establishment 
of a full monetary union. 
Types of monetary union 
The following types of monetary integration arrangements can be identified from the literature: limited and full currency convertibility; partial monetary union; parallel 
currency union; single common currency; and full monetary union. 
According to this classification, convertibility at market clearing rates is referred to 
as limited currency convertibility. In this case, all the exchange restrictions with respect 
to the existing currencies in the subregion are eliminated. Members maintain their 
currencies, which are convertible at a market clearing rate or fixed exchange rate. The 
basic aim of the limited currency convertibility is to minimize the disadvantages of multiple 
currencies that may exist in the region. This is a weak form of monetary union, as members 
are not obliged to make firm commitment to this policy. Furthermore, there is no common 
policy towards third countries, so that individual members can still formulate different 
policies towards third countries. Since this creates unrestricted exchange and use of ihe 
member countries' currencies, it is not only a modest attempt at monetary integration of 
a region, but also a way of promoting intra-regional trade. 
Unlike under a limited currency convertibility arrangement where countries can .still 
use exchange rate policy, full convertibility of members' currencies involves irrevocable 
commitments to a fixed exchange rate. Indeed, a full convertible currency arrangement 
calls for certain preconditions to be met. Such conditions include approximate external 
balance and readiness to eliminate all exchange and other restrictions on external 
transactions without undue pressure on the foreign exchange reserves (McLenaghan ct 
al„ 1982). 
The partial monetary union approach has been referred to as the European monetary 
system (EMS) model. This approach involves the harmonization of exchange rates through 
cooperative intervention in foreign exchange markets to eliminate or minimize exchange 
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risks in trade and other economic relations. The approach is based on (a) an exchange 
rate and intervention mechanism, (b) an accounting and settlement mechanism, and (c) a 
credit mechanism. It also features the establishment of a unit of account. Chipeta and 
Mkandawire (1994) described it as a loosely integrated monetary zone. This is 
characterized by (a) a close alignment of the participating members' exchange rates; (b) 
some harmonization of monetary policy through cooperative intervention in their 
exchanges; (c) some cooperation in fiscal policy; and (d) retention of substantial national 
autonomy in most areas of economic and financial policies. 
The parallel currency union model is described as a system in which a common union 
currency is issued to circulate side by side with national currencies to which it has a 
defined and fixed relationship. For the system to work there must be an irrevocable 
commitment to a permanently fixed exchange rate and full and less costly convertibility. 
In this system, national central banks are retained but their existing autonomy in monetary 
and credit management is reduced in favour of the union monetary authority, which is 
jointly exercised by the member states. It is a more advanced stage than the limited and 
full currency convertibility arrangement and the partial monetary union approach. 
The single common currency model entails the establishment of a single currency. It 
also involves a common monetary authority that is responsible for issuing a common 
currency, holding and managing the external assets of the member countries in a common 
pool, and managing the monetary and some aspects of the fiscal policies of the member 
countries. The activities of the common monetary authority are to facilitate monetary 
stability and the full and unlimited convertibility of their currency against the external 
reference currency to which it is immutably pegged. 
Complete economic and monetary union (EMU) is the ultimate goal of any monetary 
integration process. An EMU involves a single currency for the area, a complete 
displacement of all existing autonomous national banks with a regional bank (federal 
reserve type such as operates in the USA), a common external exchange rate, and common 
monetary and credit policies. The creation of money for the purpose of deficit financing 
is severely constrained. Some aspects of fiscal autonomy are also given up. 
For a sustainable monetary union, similarities in the economic structure of member 
states are not only necessary but are also important for a relatively equitable distribution 
of net benefits from integration. The process of making these economies similar has 
been termed convergence. Indeed, it is viewed that large differences in economic growth, 
inflation rates, or budget deficits among members would make monetary integration 
difficult. It can be argued that a country suffering from rising inflation would be under 
pressure to devalue. This would make a fixed exchange arrangement difficult for such a 
country. Similarly, as budget deficits hinder stable exchange rates, which thus become a 
stumbling block on the path to an irreversible fixed exchange arrangement, there is need 
to keep budget deficits at minimum levels. 
Cobham and Robson (1992) traced similar stages/processes/types of monetary 
integration. These authors also discussed the costs and benefits of different types of 
monetary integration. Elements of cost are: the loss of exchange rate as a policy tool, 
possible initial disinflation, loss of seigniorage and loss of inflation tax revenue from 
lower inflation. These costs are common to all forms of monetary integration, albeit at 
1 4 RESEARCH PAPER 1 4 7 
varying degrees. Improved price stability, reduced exchange rate variability, reduced 
transaction costs, improved price transparency, interest on saving from pooling of foreign 
exchange reserves, resource savings from centralization of monetary policy and dynamic 
gains are some of the benefits of full monetary integration. These benefits are partially 
available to all other forms of monetary integration. 
The authors conclude that while the costs appear to be similar for all forms of identi l ied 
monetary integration, the benefits seem to increase with the stages of monetary integration, 
with full benefits attainable when a monetary and economic union model is adopted. 
While this may be true for some groups of countries, the West African subregion needs 
to be thoroughly examined. Both factors that are quantifiable and those that are not 
should be included in the analysis. Also, short-term versus long-term cost-benefit analyses 
should be conducted. 
Theoretical issues in monetary union 
Since the seminal paper of Mundell (1961), the theory of optimum currency areas (OCAs) has been used in the analysis of monetary union issues. The traditional theory 
of OCAs stems from the recognition that foreign trade imposes special trading costs 
(such as transport and monetary trade costs) that are not encountered in domestic trading. 
The monetary trade costs arise because of the existence of multiple currencies and multiple 
units of account. In a modern economy, unlike the barter system, multiple currencies 
raise problems of currency conversion. The theory compares and balances the costs anil 
benefits of forming a monetary union. The net benefit is usually viewed as accruing to 
the union as a whole rather than to the individual cooperating countries. Indeed, the net 
benefit is a crucial factor in the formation of a monetary union on economic grounds. 
The main benefit of a monetary union is the reduction in transaction costs derivable 
from the elimination of separate national currencies. The point here is that the cost of 
exchanging different currencies is a stumbling block to intra-regional trade. These costs 
are regarded as a net dead-weight loss for the union as a whole. Another benefit is the 
elimination of the degree of uncertainty associated with exchange rate movements. If a 
single currency as opposed to multiple national currencies is in circulation in a union, 
there will be no exchange rate variability, hence the risk premium usually built into real 
interest rates will be reduced. Other things being equal, the implication is that a pro ject 
that was hitherto (prior to monetary union) not viable will become viable. Thus, in a 
sense, a monetary union promotes investments. The promotion of market integration and 
the strengthening of price stability within the monetary union are other benefits. Intra-
regional trade that was suppressed because of the swings in exchange rates and the 
maintenance of different units of accounts will be promoted in a monetary union setting. 
The main cost of a monetary union, on the other hand, is the member country's Joss 
of the ability to manipulate the value of its currency and to conduct an independent 
monetary policy such as devaluing its currency and adjusting its interest rate as a tool for 
macroeconomic adjustment. Inasmuch as a nominal exchange rate has real effects, the 
elimination of national currencies in a monetary union has a cost. Exchange rate as a 
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policy instrument can affect relative prices such as the real wage and the relative price of 
traded to non-traded goods. 
When economies surrender their national currencies, the management of shocks is 
left to other policy instruments such as fiscal policy. However, since macroeconomic 
disturbances affect different economies differently, the analysis of costs of forming a 
monetary union has been understandably concentrated on asymmetric shocks and 
alternative adjustment mechanisms. If the costs facing the countries are asymmetric, 
then the formation of a monetary union among them may not be beneficial as it can lead 
to deeper recession and more a pronounced business cycle (Bayoumi et al., 1997). There 
are efforts at distinguishing between supply and demand shocks. The issues in alternative 
adjustment mechanisms have focused on labour mobility within the union, wages and 
prices, and fiscal policy, among others. 
The traditional theory of OCAs can be appreciated from the perspective of the costs 
of forming a monetary union. The first criterion is the high degree of factor mobility, 
especially labour. This is an essential element in the formation of an enduring monetary 
union(Mundell ,1961). Mundell postulates that if there is a high degree of labour mobility 
within a region, the cost of forming a monetary union in the region will be minimized. 
The view is that high mobility of factors of production allows an economy within a 
monetary union to deal with asymmetric shocks through migration, lessening the need 
for adjustment through exchange rate changes. Thus, it can be averred that this proposition 
is based on an alternative adjustment mechanism. 
The second criterion, postulated by McKinnon (1963), is based on a similar argument. 
If there is a high degree of openness among nations prior to the establishment of a monetary 
union, the formation of such a union is likely to be beneficial as most prices are already 
being determined in the market. Indeed, the deviations from the law of purchasing power 
parity of individual countries are a reflection of country risks. Formation of a monetary 
union among countries with a high degree of openness eliminates the divergences of 
different national currencies in the union. Since this is likely to have been minimal prior 
to the formation of the union, the benefits of eliminating transaction costs, relative to the 
overall costs of monetary union, will ultimately be beneficial to the region. 
Kenen (1969) proposes the third criterion, which is the degree of product diversification 
among the countries intending to form a monetary union. The assumption is that a more 
diversified economy is less likely to suffer from a country-specific shock and the country' s 
exchange rate is therefore less useful in macroeconomic adjustment. Thus, surrendering 
(to the union) the exchange rate policy is less painful to such an economy. 
Vaubel (1978) provided the linkage between these three criteria and changes in real 
exchange rate as follows. First, if labour is highly mobile, unemployment in an area 
within the monetary union will be eliminated through labour migration to other areas in 
the union. Thus, fewer attempts would be made to change the real wage through exchange 
rate depreciation. Second, if trade between members of a monetary union is highly 
diversified, according to Vaubel (1978), the law of large numbers reduces the probability 
and the size of changes in each country's terms of trade. Hence countries whose external 
transactions are highly diversified will experience only small real exchange rate changes. 
Third, the openness criterion concerns macroeconomic efficiency of nominal exchange 
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rate changes, for the openness of an economy is, if at all, negatively con-elated with stock 
of exchange rate illusion available for real adjustment through nominal exchange rate 
changes. Observed real exchange rate changes tend to be smaller, the more open the 
potential member economies are vis-a-vis each other. 
From these linkages it can be understood why most studies on the evaluation of viability 
of a monetary union have concentrated on exchange rate variability. This is also because 
the three criteria (high labour mobility, trade diversification and degree of openness) are 
difficult to measure. 
Empirical issues in measuring the potential effects of 
monetary union 
The literature on monetary zones is biased towards the experience of the developed countries. Among the few studies relating to developing countries are Devarajan 
and de Melo (1987,1990) and Guillaumont et al. (1988). These studies relate to the CFA 
franc zone. The aim of Devarajan and de Melo (1987, 1990) was to test for differences 
between the GNP growth rates of CFA zone countries and that of the group of 
"comparator" countries. The finding of Devarajan and de Melo (1987) that CFA countries 
grew significantly faster than the "comparator" countries in the 1970s was attributed to 
the effective functioning of the CFA monetary union. According to them the results cast 
doubt on the concern that the CFA monetary union was not functioning adequately. 
Devarajan and de Melo (1990) were motivated by developments in other SSA 
countries, especially real exchange rate depreciation. Other concerns included the slow 
or negative growth in per capita GDP, worsening balance of payments, debt crises, 
financial crises, declining competitiveness, and apparent failure of CFA franc countries 
to adjust to the changed environment they inherited from the 1970s. The inability of the 
CFA zone to adjust to external developments was responsible for the observed 
unwholesome economic performance of this group of countries. Thus, the benefits of 
convertible currency and a fixed exchange rate resulted in monetary and fiscal discipline, 
which in turn was beneficial to CFA members in the 1970s. However, the rigidity of 
exchange rate policy hurt these countries in the 1980s, as necessary external adjustment 
was not practicable under the type of monetary zone that was adopted. 
Apart from the short-run costs and benefits of monetary zone membership, Devarajan 
and de Melo (1987) identified the long-run benefits of participation. The benefits derived 
from currency convertibility include (a) minimum speculative capital flows and exchange 
rate risk induced capital flight and (b) possible increase in foreign direct investment. 
Other related studies are Guillaumont et al. (1988) and Chipeta and Mkandawire (1994). 
These studies evaluated existing monetaiy unions using either comparative analysis (using 
groups of "comparators") or trend analysis (of some variables that are germane to effective 
monetary union). Jenkins and Thomas (1996), however, concentrated on the readiness 
of Southern African countries for monetary union. They examined some macroeconomic 
variables for their convergence and concluded that the region was not yet ready for 
monetary union. 
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Most of the studies on the measurement of the potential effects of forming a monetary 
union are based on the experience of the European Union (EU) (Bofinger, 1994; von 
Hagen and Hammond, 1995; Artis and Zhang, 1997; Bauyomi and Prasad, 1995; Erkel-
Rousse and Melitz, 1995; among others). However, instead of estimating the degree of 
factor mobility, the degree of openness and the degree of diversification within nations 
intending to form a monetary union, their preoccupations have been on asymmetric shocks 
and exchange rate variability. Only a few studies concentrated on the measurement of 
transaction costs that will be eliminated as a result of the formation of a union. The 
review here, which is in two parts (asymmetric shocks and measurement of transaction 
costs), will be on the method of analysis used by these scholars. The purpose is to generate 
a method of analysis for this study. 
The concentration of the investigation of monetary union on analysis of asymmetric 
shocks is informed by the sustainability of the union. The point is that even if other 
factors (economic and political) are taken into consideration in the formation of a monetary 
union, the sustainability of the union depends on the response of member countries to 
external shocks: symmetric or asymmetric. The more the members' response is symmetric, 
the less the need for policy coordination. Similarly, the wider the range of policy variables 
tied by international treaty, the smaller the likelihood of compliance (Jenkins and Thomas, 
1996). This is more important for the West Africa subregion given the poor level of 
implementation and compliance with the regional agreements including the ECOWAS 
treaty. The fact is that the higher the asymmetric shocks the higher the possibility of non-
compliance with the protocol on monetary union. 
Because of the importance of asymmetric shocks in the analysis of the cost of a 
monetary union, a great deal of attention has been focused on how to measure such 
shocks. Vaubel (1978), singled out as the pioneer attempt at measuring symmetry 
disturbances across members of a potential monetary union, focused on the variance of 
real exchange rates as a measure of asymmetric shocks. Von Hagen and Neumann (1994) 
adopted similar approaches. The major issue in this approach has been the determination 
of a benchmark of the real exchange rate variation. The use of observed real exchange 
rate (RER) variances within an existing union and the comparison of RER among countries 
with different economic structures are popular approaches to this problem. Some other 
studies have examined the correlation of output movements across potential members of 
a monetary union as a measure of asymmetric shocks. 
Empirical methods of analysing the asymmetric shocks for a country intending to 
join a monetary union include correlation between business cycle and cluster analysis 
(Artis and Zhang, 1997). Another method of analysing the asymmetric shocks is the 
structural vector autoregressive (VAR) approach by Erkel-Rousse and Melitz (1995). 
There have also been studies that compared asymmetric shocks among different countries 
in two areas especially between the European Union and the United States. 
The approach to the measurement of the benefits of monetary union is not as developed 
as that of its costs. The assumption is that if the costs of monetary union are minimized, 
the net benefits are likely to be significant. Nevertheless, there are studies that have 
calculated transaction costs, such as Chipeta and Mkandawire (1994) and Emerson et al. 
(1992). The savings from transaction costs for Malawi in the context of the Southern 
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African Development Cooperation (SADC) for the years 1989 to 1991 were calculated 
as foreign exchange profits by banks in the country on international transactions involving 
Malawi and other members of SADC. The foreign exchange profit is made up of gross 
revenue from exchange and commission. As part of the benefits of monetary union, 
Chipeta and Mkandawire also calculated savings in foreign exchange on intra-union 
trade as the value of intra-union imports. 
4. Real exchange rate model 
The method of analysing the costs of a viable monetary union in West Africa follows closely the methodology developed by von Hagen and Neumann (1994) and applied to the European Union (EU). In what follows, the method is generalized 
and presented as an application to ECOWAS. Von Hagen and Neumann's approach 
appealed for this study because of the way it handles the benchmark of RER variances. 
The study used RER variances in Europe as the standard to assess the RER variances 
among the European currency areas. Apart from taking care of differences in shocks or 
economic structures, the approach also fits the currency arrangement in West Africa. In 
general, the approach involves calculating the conditional variances of RER. 
Real exchange rate variability as a measure of viability 
of a monetary union 
Assume two groups of countries, A and B, where the group B countries operate a fixed exchange rate. This assumption fits the current monetary arrangement in the 
ECOWAS subregion where the countries in group B are the seven CFA zone West African 
countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, C6te d'lvoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo). The 
non-CFA countries (group A) consist of Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania and Nigeria. The fulcrum of the real exchange 
rate (RER) model is the comparative analysis of RER variability between two groups of 
countries. 
RER between a country in group A (non-CFA zone countries) and any country (in 
either group A or group B) can be expressed as 
Qiib.t 
= P a i , t + S a b i , t - P b , t ( 1 ) 
where Q a i b t is the logarithm of the real exchange rate between country i in group A 
and any country in group B at time t. P a i (is the consumer price index (CPI) of country i in 
group A, at time t expressed in logarithm. S a b i t is the logarithm of the nominal exchange 
rate between country i's currency (i belonging to group A countries) and the currency of 
group B countries at time t. P b. (is the logarithm of the CPI of country j in group B at time 
t. 
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RER between any pair of group B countries (that is, CFA zone countries) is determined 
in a similar manner. However, since the nominal exchange rate between any pair of 
countries in the group is fixed, only the CPIs determine the RER. Thus, the RER between 
any two group B countries is defined as: 
Qbj.bk.t — b^j.t " b^k,t (2) 
where P b j t is the CPI of country j in group B at time t expressed in logarithm. P b k t is the 
logarithm of the CPI of country k in group B. 
Define the observed changes in RER between two countries in group A or between 
country i in group A and any other country in group B at time t as DQ a i b t. Similarly, 
define the observed changes in RER between country j in group B and country k in the 
same group as DQ b j b k These changes are regressed on four dummies for the quarterly 
model and 12 dummies for the monthly model in order to eliminate seasonal effects. 
Thus for the non-CFA zone countries we estimated: 
DQ . = YB D + e .., (3) a^ib.t m m aib.t V^ ) 
where B m are the parameters to be estimated and D m are the quarterly/monthly dummies. 
e a i b t are the regression residuals, which are interpretable as seasonally adjusted RER 
changes. For the CFA zone West African countries the estimated equations are: 
DQ b j b k, t= YB m D m + e b j b k , t (4) 
As in the equations for non-CFA zone West African countries, e b j b k t i s the residual of 
the regression interpretable as seasonally adjusted RER changes. 
In order to eliminate the unexpected components of the seasonally adjusted RER 
changes, a vector autoregressive model was estimated, i.e., the seasonally adjusted RER 
change was regressed on its lag. The number of lags depends on when the residuals from 
the autoregressive are not autocorrelated. The residuals from the autoregressive models 
are referred to as RER shocks and their variances are the conditional RER variance. Let 
m a i b t and m b j b k t be the residual of the autoregressive model for groups of countries A and 
B, respectively. Their variances are interpretable as the conditional RER variances. If 
these variances are averaged over the number of countries in group B, then we have: 
V a i=l/b Y{variance (m a i b t)} 0- 5 (5) 
V b . = l / b f {variance (m b j b k t )} 0 5 (6) 
For the real exchange rate variability model, two periods - pre- and post-structural 
adjustment -were considered. Specifically, 1970 to 1986 was used in the estimation of 
the pre-SAP period and 1992 to 1997 denotes the post-SAP period. The two periods are 
necessary to evaluate whether structural adjustment has brought about a change in RER 
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variability. The consumer price index, at a nominal exchange rate, for all the West African 
countries will be required at quarterly and monthly levels. However, the required data 
for the implementation of the RER variability model (i.e., CPIs and nominal exchange 
rates) were only available on a consistent basis for eight of the 16 West African countries. 
These are five CFA zone countries (Benin, Cote d'lvoire, Niger, Senegal and Togo) and 
three non-CFA zone countries (The Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria). Monthly and quarterly 
data on CPIs and exchange rates for these countries from January 1970 to December 
1997 were obtained from International Monetary Fund (IMF) sources. 
Monthly RER model 
The implementation of equations 1 - 4 yielded seasonally adjusted RER changes for the selected West African countries. The process of eliminating the unexpected 
components requires an autoregressive model. The daunting task was to determine the 
number of lags to be included in the model necessary for its residuals to be non-
autocorrelated. The Breush-Godfrey-Lagrange multiplier test for serially correlated 
disturbances was adopted. For most of the regression models nine lags were sufficient to 
make the residuals non-autocorrelated. These residuals were interpreted as RER shocks. 
The standard deviations (SDs) of the RER were analysed, beginning with the SDs of 
RER shocks for the entire West Africa covering the period from January 1970 to December 
1997. For the entire West Africa, subperiods of the sample were considered, i.e., 1970-
1986 as pre-SAP era and 1992-1997 as post-SAP. 
Second, the SDs of RER shocks were analysed along the CFA zone and non-CFA 
zone divide. Again, the analysis was carried out on the entire sample period as well as on 
the two subsample periods. The first level of analysis throws more light on the 
developments in RER shocks over time. More importantly, the second level of analysis 
attempts to gauge the effects of SAP, and to compare SDs of RER shocks in CFA zone 
countries with those of non-CFA zone countries. 
Monthly RER shocks in ECOWAS, 1970 to 1997 
The summary statistics of the RER shocks for the eight countries between January 
1970 and December 1997 are shown in Appendix Figure Al . Table 3, which summarizes 
information on RER shocks in ECOWAS, is derived from Appendix Tables A1-A4. 
First, the bilateral RER shocks for the entire period ranged between -0.091 and 2.351. 
Even within the set of countries, the minimum RER shocks in one country can be a 
multiple of the minimum RER shocks in another country. The maximum RER shocks 
also vary between 0.100 and 2.365 among countries. The standard deviations of the RER 
shocks for the entire period ranged between 0.026 and 0.22. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of the bilateral monthly RER shocks for ECOWAS, 1970 to 1997 
1970 to 1997 1970 to 1986 1987 to1991 1992 to 1997 
Range for min RER shocks -0.091 to-2.351 -0.091 to-2.351 -0.034 to-0.640 -0.043 to-0.718 
Range for max RER shocks 0.100 to 2.365 0.100 to 2.365 0.031 to 0.619 0.036 to 0.679 
Range for std deviation 0.0259 to 0.216 0.030 to 0.249 0.016 to 0.170 0.018 too. 146 
The pre-SAP (1970-1986) analysis revealed that the ranges for minimum and 
maximum RER shocks were the same as for the 1970-1997 period. A slight change in 
the standard deviations of RER shocks was noted, however. For the pre-SAP era the SDs 
of RER shocks ranged between 0.03 and 0.25, as against between 0.026 and 0.22 for the 
entire period. 
Between 1987 and 1992, when SAPs were being implemented by these countries, the 
SDs of RER shocks narrowed to between 0.016 and 0.17. The ranges for both minimum 
RER shocks also narrowed from -0.091-2.351 in the pre-SAP era to between -0.034 and 
0.64 during SAP implementation. A similar trend is visible in the case of maximum 
values of RER shocks, which narrowed from 0.100-2.365 in the pre-SAP era to 0.031-
0.0619 during SAP implementation. The post-SAP analysis reveals further convergence 
in the SDs of RER shocks; for the period they ranged from 0.081 to 0.146. The ranges 
for the minimum and the maximum RER shocks also contracted. 
Some important observations from this analysis are noteworthy. First, SDs of RER 
shocks in the pre-SAP period dominated the analysis for the entire period. Second, SDs 
of the RER shocks in the pre-SAP era were higher than those in the post-SAP. Thus, 
variability of RER shocks was minimized in the post-SAP period. The observed trend 
can be attributed to the implementation of liberalized trade, payment and exchange rate 
regimes. 
Monthly RER shocks in ECOWAS: CFA zone versus non-CFA 
zone countries 
For the purpose of the analysis in the subsection, the bilateral RER shocks are 
partitioned into three: intra-CFA zone RER shocks; intra-non-CFA zone RER shocks; 
and RER shocks between CFA and non-CFA zone countries. 
The SDs of the intra-CFA RER shocks ranged between 0.0267 and 0.0429 for the 
period from 1970 to 1997 (see Table 4). During the pre-SAP period (1970-1986), the 
SDs of intra-CFA RER shocks ranged from 0.0311 to 0.0505. In the post-SAP period, 
SDs of intra-CFA RER shocks ranged between 0.0176 and 0.0463, suggesting a further 
contraction in the spread of SDs of intra-CFA RER shocks. 
Since the CFA-zone countries were in a monetary zone even before the implementation 
of structural adjustment, the result suggests deepened monetary integration among these 
economies after the implementation of SAP. Thus, the result confirmed the effectiveness 
of UEMOA, which was an amalgamation of the West African Economic Community 
and the West Africa Monetary Union (late 1993). 
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Table 4: Standard deviations of monthly RER shocks, 1970-1997. 
Cote 
d'lvoire 
Niger Senegal Togo Gambia Ghana Nigeria 
Benin 1970-1997 0.0374 0.0429 0.0394 0.0294 0.0764 0.2164 0.1156 
1970-1986 0.0455 0.0505 0.0471 0.0473 0.0783 0.2495 0.1089 
1992-1997 0.0202 0.0463 0.0218 0.0183 0.0895 0.1444 0.1205 
Cote d'lvoire 1970-1997 - 0.0303 0.0267 0.0286 0.0670 0.2097 0.1075 
1970-1986 - 0.0351 0.0311 0.0329 0.0632 0.2418 0.817 
1992-1997 - 0.0195 0.0176 0.0196 0.0879 0.1374 0.1173 
Niger 1970-1997 - 0.0309 0.0314 0.0702 0.2121 0.117 
1970-1986 - 0.0355 0.0351 0.0679 0.2416 0.0848 
1992-1997 - 0.1243 0.0183 0.00839 0.0976 0.0403 
Senegal 1970-1997 - 0.0286 0.0708 0.2135 0.116 
1970-1986 - 0.0329 0.0640 0.2426 0.0823 
1992-1997 - 0.0345 0.0447 0.0987 0.0349 
Togo 1970-1997 - 0.0687 0.2127 0.11 
1970-1986 - 0.0679 0.2449 0.0832 
1992-1997 - 0.0457 0.0958 0.0385 
Gambia 1970-1997 - 0.1965 0.0702 
1970-1986 - 0.2247 0.073 
1992-1997 - 0.0893 0.0368 
Ghana 1970-1997 - 0.1846 
1970-1986 - 0.2311 
1992-1997 - 0.0901 
The global minimum SDs of the RER shocks of intra-CFA zone corresponds to the 
minimum for the entire ECOWAS, but none of the intra-CFA zone of the SDs of the 
RER shocks corresponds to the global maximum. 
The SDs of the RER shocks of intra-non CFA countries ranged between 0.0913 and 
0.197 for the entire period, 1970 to 1997. The pre-SAP (1986-1992) figures showed a 
wider range, from 0.0857 to 0.227. During SAP, the range of the SDs of the RER shocks 
of the intra-non-CFA currencies narrows to between 0.105 and 0.146. The range was 
further reduced to between 0.09 and 0.115. Although the SDs of RER shocks of intra-
non-CFA currencies have greatly reduced, they are still far from what obtains in the 
CFA zone even in the pre-SAP era. While the range of SDs of intra-CFA currencies in 
1970-1986 was between 0.0298 and 0.0511, the SDs of intra-non-CFA currencies was 
between 0.09 and 0.115 for 1992-1997. SAP implementation helped in reducing RER 
variability in both the CFA and non-CFA currencies, but the SDs of the RER shocks 
show that monetary union among CFA and non-CFA countries will require further 
convergence in the RER variability. 
How comparable are the variations in the RER shocks in CFA zone countries with 
those of non-CFA zone countries? Table 5 provides the average real exchange rate shocks 
over all the countries in the sample, both CFA zone and non-CFA zone. The table reveals 
that SDs of RER shocks between CFA and non-CFA West African countries are much 
larger than among the CFA countries. For the entire period, non-CFA countries had SDs 
ranging between 3.4 and 4.2 times larger than the intra-CFA SDs. For the pre-SAP period 
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(1970-1986), countries outside the CFA zone had SDs of RER shocks ranging between 
3.0 and 3.6 times larger than the intra CFA zone SDs. During the post-SAP period, 
however, the countries outside the CFA zone had STDs of RER shocks of 1.6-1.8 times 
those of the intra-CFA zone. No doubt, the conditional RER variability has declined 
dramatically with the implementation of SAP by West African countries. 
Table 5: Average standard deviations of monthly RER shocks, 1970-1997 
Benin Cote 
d'lvoire 
Niger Senegal Togo Gambia Ghana Nigeria 
Average over 1970- 1997 0.0811 0.0725 0.0756 0.0745 0.0742 0.0855 0.2065 0.1159 
ALL countries 1970-
1992-
1986 
1997 
0.0870 
0.0558 
0.0759 
0.0441 
0.0786 
0.0451 
0.0765 
0.0467 
0.0777 
0.0457 
0.0912 
0.0507 
0.2394 
0.0967 
0.1043 
0 0479 
Average over 1970- 1997 0.0398 0.0308 0.0339 0.0314 0.0320 0.0706 0.2129 0.113 
CFA countries 1970-
1992-
1986 
1997 
0.0474 
0.0440 
0.0361 
0.0325 
0.0391 
0.0333 
0.0367 
0.0371 
0.0369 
0.0349 
0.0681 
0.0457 
0.2440 
0.0995 
0.0851 
0.0416 
Average over 1970- 1997 0.1361 0.1281 0.1313 0.132 0.1305 0.1334 0.1906 0.1274 
Non-CFA countries 1970-
1992-
1986 
1997 
0.1398 
0.072 
0.1289 
0.0596 
0.1314 
0.609 
0.1296 
0.0594 
0.132 
0.06 
0.1489 
0.0631 
0.2279 
0.09 
0.1521 
0.0635 
Source: Computed by the author. 
Quarterly RER model 
T h e results of the quarterly data model are presented in tables 6 through 8. For 
comparison purposes a similar pattern of analysis was used. The RER shocks in 
ECOWAS between 1970 and 1997 are presented in Table 6, which points to narrowing 
RER variations. The range for minimum RER shocks was between -2.283 and -0.094 for 
the entire period covered by the analysis. The range for maximum RER shocks was 
between 0.099 and 2.323 and the standard deviations of the RER shocks were between 
0.035 and 0.356. Both the minimum and the maximum values followed the observed 
pattern in the monthly model. Noteworthy is the shrinking of the range of the SDs from 
0.04-0.404 in the pre-SAP era to 0.030-0.1151 in the post-SAP era. Thus, the quarterly 
model confirms the convergence in SDs of RER shocks noted in the monthly model. On 
the development of RER shocks over the years, it can be concluded that these shocks 
have been converging and there is no evidence that further convergence is feasible. 
Is there any difference between the RER shocks among the CFA zone West African 
countries and among other countries in the region? Analysis of the results along CFA 
zone divides shows that each country in the CFA zone exhibits minimum RER shocks. 
The shocks among this group of countries are also comparable with each other. 
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Table 6: Summary statistics of quarterly RER shocks 
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Entire period Pre-SAP Post-SAP 
SD MIN MAX SD MIN MAX STD MiN MAX 
Benin-C6te d'lvoire 0.042 -0.101 0.127 
Benin-Niger 0.053 -0.153 0.165 
Benin-Senegal 0.045 -0.106 0.185 
Benin-Togo 0.044 -0.116 0.131 
Benin-Gambia 0.140 -0,929 0.669 
Benin-Ghana 0.355 -2.266 0.379 
Benin-Nigeria 0.191 -0.839 0.521 
Cote d'lvoire-Benin 0.042 -0.101 0.127 
Cote d'lvoire-Niger 0.043 -0.154 0.157 
Cote d'lvoire-Senegal 0.035 -0.114 0.166 
Cote d'lvoire-Togo 0.037 -0.099 0.099 
Cote d'lvoire-Gambia 0.132 -0.877 0.716 
Cote d'lvoire-Ghana 0.348 -2.283 0.358 
Cote d'lvoire-Nigeria 0.180 -0.785 0.569 
Niger-Benin 0.053 -0.153 0.165 
Niger-C6te d'lvoire 0.043 -0.154 0.157 
Niger-Senegal 0.040 -0.120 0.150 
Niger-Togo 0.040 -0.109 0.123 
Niger-Ghana 0.354 -0.368 2.217 
Niger-Gambia 0.142 -0.756 0.957 
Niger-Nigeria 0.191 -0.832 0.610 
Senegal-Benin 0.045 -0.106 0.185 
Senegal-Niger 0.040 -0.120 0.150 
Senegal-C6te d'lvoire 0.035 -0.114 0.166 
Senegal-Togo 0.037 -0.099 0.099 
Senegal-Gambia 0.137 -0.769 0.887 
Senegal-Ghana 0.356 -0.367 2.271 
Senegal-Nigeria 0.187 -0.623 0.801 
Togo-Benin 0.044 -0.116 0.131 
Togo-Niger 0.040 -0.109 0.123 
Togo-Senegal 0.037 -0.099 0.099 
Togo-Cdte d'lvoire 0.037 -0.099 0.099 
Togo-Gambia 0.137 -0.740 0.901 
Togo-Ghana 0.356 -0.365 2.323 
Togo-Nigeria 0.187 -0.592 0.825 
Gambia-Benin 0.140 -0.929 0.669 
Gambia-Niger 0.142 -0.756 0.957 
Gambia-Senegal 0.137 -0.769 0.887 
Gambia-Togo 0.137 -0.740 0.901 
Gambia-C6te d'lvoire 0.132 -0.877 0.716 
Gambia-Ghana 0.328 -2.267 0.316 
Gambia-Nigeria 0.168 -0.782 0.678 
0.050 -0.109 0.124 0.044 -0.081 0.067 
0.061 -0.132 0.155 0.052 -0.102 0.089 
0.054 -0.099 0.168 0.055 -0.118 0.084 
0.052 -0.117 0.127 0.051 -0.131 0.065 
0.146 -0.921 0.185 0.077 -0.173 0.099 
0.403 -2.187 0.411 0.145 -0.420 0.266 
0.137 -0.522 0.151 0.075 -0.164 0.100 
0.050 -0.109 0.124 0.044 -0.081 0,067 
0.048 -0.144 0.140 0.030 -0.055 0.086 
0.040 -0.121 0.158 0.042 -0.147 0.036 
0.043 -0.106 0.117 0.044 -0.074 0.130 
0.132 -0.858 0.163 0.071 -0.168 0.139 
0.397 -2.213 0.381 0.145 -0.463 0.209 
0.118 -0.420 0.149 0.064 -0.155 0.121 
0.061 -0.132 0.155 0.052 -0.102 0.089 
0.048 -0.144 0.140 0.030 -0.055 0.086 
0.048 -0.124 0.153 0.047 -0.143 0.045 
0.042 -0.089 0.112 0.035 -0.067 0.078 
0.398 -0.388 2.145 0.151 -0.210 0.474 
0.137 -0.102 0,917 0.066 -0.111 0.178 
0.122 -0.479 0.143 0.059 -0.160 0.093 
0.054 -0.099 0.168 0.055 -0.118 0.084 
0.048 -0.124 0.153 0.047 -0.143 0.045 
0.040 -0.121 0.158 0.042 -0.147 0.036 
0.043 -0.106 0.117 0.044 -0.074 0.130 
0.132 -0.104 0.868 0.051 -0.115 0.111 
0.401 -0.388 2.207 0.141 -0.197 0.477 
0.123 -0.186 0.486 0.048 -0.090 0.117 
0.052 -0.117 0.127 0.051 -0.131 0.065 
0.042 -0.089 0.112 0.035 -0.067 0.078 
0.043 -0.106 0.117 0.044 -0.074 0.130 
0.043 -0.106 0.117 0.044 -0.074 0.130 
0.135 -0.102 0.879 0.070 -0.123 0.153 
0.404 -0.390 2.249 0.140 -0.195 0.420 
0.120 -0.135 0.457 0.058 -0.103 0.139 
0.146 -0.921 0.185 0.077 -0.173 0.099 
0.137 -0.102 0.917 0.066 -0.111 0.178 
0.132 -0.104 0.868 0.051 -0.115 0.111 
0.135 -0.102 0.879 0.070 -0.123 0.153 
0.132 -0.858 0.163 0.071 -0.168 0.139 
0.376 -2.212 0.357 0.142 -0.455 0.165 
0.137 -0.533 0.700 0.059 -0.185 0.107 
continued next page 
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Table 6: continued 
Entire period Pre-SAP Post-SAP 
SD MIN MAX SD MIN MAX SD MIN MAX 
Ghana-Benin 0.355 -2.266 0.379 0.403 -2.187 0.411 0.145 -0.420 0.266 
Ghana-Niger 0.354 -0.368 2.217 0.398 -0.388 2.145 0.151 -0.210 0.474 
Ghana-Senegal 0.356 -0.367 2.271 0.401 -0.388 2.207 0.141 -0.197 0.477 
Ghana-Togo 0.356 -0.365 2.323 0.404 -0.390 2.249 0.140 -0.195 0.420 
Ghana-Cote d'lvoire 0.348 -2.283 0.358 0.397 -2.213 0.381 0.145 -0.463 0.209 
Ghana-Gambia 0.328 -2.267 0.316 0.376 -2.212 0.357 0.142 -0.455 0.165 
Ghana-Nigeria 0.311 -0.747 2.306 0.385 -0.817 2.256 0.134 -0.202 0.455 
Nigeria-Benin 0.191 -0.839 0.521 0.137 -0.522 0.151 0.075 -0.164 0.100 
Nigeria-C6te d'lvoire 0.180 -0.785 0.569 0.118 -0.420 0.149 0.064 -0.155 0.121 
Nigeria-Senegal 0.187 -0.623 0.801 0.123 -0.186 0.486 0.048 -0.090 0.117 
Nigeria-Togo 0.187 -0.592 0.825 0.120 -0.135 0.457 0.058 -0.103 0.139 
Nigeria-Niger 0.191 -0.832 0.610 0.122 -0.479 0.143 0.059 -0.160 0.093 
Nigeria-Gambia 0.168 -0.782 0.678 0.137 -0.533 0.700 0.059 -0.185 0.107 
Nigeria-Ghana 0.311 -0.747 2.306 0.385 -0.817 2.256 0.134 -0.202 0.455 
For example, in the pre-SAP era, the average (over all countries in the sample (CFA 
and non-CFA West African countries) SDs of RER shocks was between 0.118 and 0.129. 
Similar trends were observed for other categorization of countries in the sample (see 
Table 7). 
Pre-SAP and post-SAP analyses revealed that average SDs of RER shocks declined 
slightly in almost all the selected CFA zone countries. The observed impact of SAPs on 
the SDs of RER shocks in these countries can be attributed to the restraints on monetary, 
exchange rate and other policies even prior to the introduction of SAPs in this group of 
countries. Apart from Senegal, which recorded a slight increase in the SDs of RER shocks, 
all other CFA zone countries in the sample recorded a decrease in the SDs of RER 
shocks. 
Historically, SDs of RER shocks of non-CFA zone West African countries were high. 
The average SDs of RER shocks for this group of countries (over all the selected countries 
for the entire period) was between 0.169 and 0.344. Pre-SAP and post-SAP analyses 
revealed a significant convergence. In all cases the post-SAP era SD of RER shocks was 
less than half of its pre-SAP figure. 
The historical development in SDs of RER shocks across the CFA and non-CFA 
zone West African countries and between monthly and quarterly models is clearly brought 
out in Table 8, which shows that both quarterly and monthly models capture the 
development in, the RER shocks in the subregion. The last column of the table shows that 
the changes in non-CFA countries in the region were higher than those in the CFA zone. 
Notwithstanding these substantial changes, the SDs of RER shocks in the non-CFA were 
still higher than their counterparts in the CFA zone. 
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T a b le 7: Standard deviations of quarterly RER shocks, 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 9 7 
CFA zone countries Non-CFA zone countries 
1 9 7 0 - 9 7 1 9 7 0 - 8 6 1 9 9 2 - 9 7 1 9 7 0 - 9 7 1 9 7 0 - 8 6 1 9 9 2 - 9 7 
Entire 
period 
Pre-SAP Post-SAP Entire 
period 
Pre-SAP Post-SAP 
Benin Gambia 
All 
CFA 
Non-CFA 
0 . 1 2 4 
0 . 0 4 6 
0 . 2 2 9 
0 . 1 2 9 
0 . 0 5 4 
0 . 2 2 9 
0 . 0 7 1 
0 . 0 5 1 
0 . 0 9 9 
All 
CFA 
Non-CFA 
0 . 1 6 9 
0 . 1 3 9 
0 . 2 0 9 
0 . 1 7 1 
0 . 1 3 8 
0 . 2 1 5 
0 . 0 7 7 
0 . 0 6 6 
0 . 0 9 1 
C6te d'lvoire Ghana 
All 
CFA 
Non-CFA 
0 . 1 1 7 
0 . 0 3 9 
0 . 2 2 0 
0 . 1 1 8 
0 . 0 4 5 
0 . 2 1 6 
0 . 0 6 3 
0 . 0 4 0 
0 . 0 9 3 
All 
CFA 
Non-CFA 
0 . 3 4 4 
0 . 3 5 5 
0 . 3 2 9 
0 . 3 9 5 
0 . 4 0 2 
0 . 3 8 6 
0 . 1 4 3 
0 . 1 4 4 
0 . 1 4 1 
Niger Nigeria 
All 
CFA 
Non-CFA 
0 . 1 2 3 
0 . 0 4 4 
0 , 2 2 9 
0 . 1 2 2 
0 . 0 5 0 
0 . 2 1 9 
0 . 0 6 3 
0 . 0 4 1 
0 . 0 9 2 
All 
CFA 
Non-CFA 
0 . 2 0 2 
0 . 1 8 6 
0 . 2 2 3 
0 . 1 6 3 
0 . 1 2 5 
0 . 2 1 5 
0 . 0 7 1 
0 . 0 6 1 
0 . 0 8 4 
Senegal 
All 
CFA 
Non-CFA 
0 . 1 2 0 
0 . 0 3 9 
0 . 2 2 7 
0 . 1 2 0 
0 . 0 4 6 
0 . 2 1 9 
0 . 0 6 1 
0 . 0 4 7 
0 . 0 8 0 
Togo 
All 
CFA 
Non-CFA 
0 . 1 2 0 
0 . 0 4 0 
0 . 2 2 6 
0 . 1 2 0 
0 . 0 4 5 
0 . 2 2 0 
0 . 0 6 3 
0 . 0 4 3 
0 . 0 8 9 
Thus, a monetary union among the CFA and non-CFA countries in West Africa today 
has better prospects than it did earlier. However, since the non-CFA zone countries have 
SDs higher than SDs those within the CFA zone, there is still need for further convergence 
before any monetary zone among the CFA zone countries and their non-CFA counterparts 
can be sustainable. It should be noted that the monetary arrangement in the CFA zone is 
far from ideal, thus a further improvement is still expected from the benchmark RER 
shocks. Perhaps a comparison of the RER shocks in the EU will throw more light. 
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Table 8: Monthly and quarterly STDs of RER shocks 
Pre-SAP Post-SAP % change 
Quarterly model 
CFA West African countries 
Benin 0.054 0.051 5.56 
Cote d'lvoire 0.045 0.040 11.11 
Niger 0.050 0.041 18.00 
Senegal 0.046 0.047 -2.17 
Togo 0.045 0.043 4.44 
Non-CFA West African countries 
Gambia 0.138 0.066 52.17 
Ghana 0.402 0.144 64.18 
Nigeria 0.125 0.061 51.20 
Monthly model 
CFA West African countries 
Benin 0.047 0.044 6.38 
Cote d'lvoire 0.036 0.032 11.11 
Niger 0.039 0.033 15.38 
Senegal 0.037 0.037 0.00 
Togo 0.037 0.035 5.41 
Non-CFA West African countries 
Gambia 0.068 0.046 32.35 
Ghana 0.244 0.100 59.02 
Nigeria 0.085 0.042 50.59 
Test for constant variances 
A test for constant variances was performed on the estimates. Again two levels of analysis were involved: the monthly and the quarterly models. White's test for 
heteroscedasticity was performed on each of the 28 equations per model. The averages 
of significant levels over the CFA zone countries were computed and presented in tables 
9 and 10. 
As seen in Table 9, the variances of monthly bilateral RER shocks average over all 
countries for the entire period, 1970-1997, were significantly different from zero at less 
than 5% for the CFA zone countries and Nigeria. For the other non-CFA zone countries. 
The Gambia was marginally significant at 10.8% and there is evidence of strong 
homoscedasticity in the case of Ghana. This pattern was also observed in the subperiod. 
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j 970-1986, when for most CFA zone countries and Nigeria the test statistics were 
significant at 10%. An exception to the group of CFA zone countries is Niger, where it 
was only significant at about 10.5%. Gambia was significant at about 13%, while Ghana's 
case still depicts the presence of strong homoscedasticity. Still, on average over all 
countries, the post-SAP 1992-1997 period revealed that the estimates of variances are 
constant for all the countries in the sample, CFA and non-CFA zone countries alike, at 
below 10% level of significance. An exception is Senegal, which is a borderline case as 
it was only significant at 10.3%. 
In the case of the average over CFA zone countries, the averages of the tests for 
constant variances follow a similar pattern to those of the averages over all the countries 
in the sample. In summary, all the estimates for all the CFA zone countries and Nigeria 
were statistically different from zero at less than 10%; in most cases they were significant 
at less than 5% for the entire period, 1970-1997. Turning to subperiods, the pre-SAP 
estimates present a mix result. Only the results for Benin, Niger and Senegal in the CFA 
zone countries and Nigeria in the non-CFA zone countries were statistically significant 
ut 10%. Cote d'lvoire and Togo results show evidence of homoscedasticity. Both The 
Gambia's and Ghana's results show evidence of strong homoscedasticity. More mixed 
results were obtained in the case of the last subsample period, the post-SAP. In the CFA 
/.one group of countries, only the results for Cote d'lvoire and Niger were significant at 
the 10% level. The results for other non-CFA zone countries were only significant at 
below 15%. The results for all the non-CFA countries were, however, statistically 
significant at less that 10%. 
The averages over non-CFA zone countries for the entire period, 1970 to 1997, 
reflected the presence of homoscedasticity with respect to all the CFA zone countries 
and Ghana. However, the subperiods (pre- and post-SAP) revealed constant variances 
for all the countries except Ghana in the pre-SAP period and The Gambia in the post-
SAP period. Both Senegal and Nigeria were at borderline as they were significant at 
abi >ut 10.3 and 10.7% level of significant in the post-SAP period. The result points to the 
appropriateness of periodization in the analysis of the test for constant variances. 
Table 9: Test for constant monthly variances, 1970-1997 
Benin C6te 
d'lvoire 
Niger Senegal Togo Gambia Ghana Nigeria 
Average over 
ALL countries 
1970-1997 
1970-1986 
1992-1997 
0.001671 
0.028806 
0.092059 
0.009405 
0.054127 
0.072092 
0.000843 
0.010529 
0.075831 
0.004872 
0.039384 
0.103403 
0.047609 
0.071524 
0.090657 
0.108451 
0.130847 
0.091786 
0.999988 
0.999992 
0.058414 
0.001890 
0.000018 
0.086402 
Average over 
CFA countries 
1970-1997 
1970-1986 
1992-1997 
0.000018 
0.065473 
0.123201 
0.000510 
0.192978 
0.071929 
0.000011 
0.011457 
0.078443 
0.000391 
0.023454 
0.141210 
0.008941 
0.313849 
0.115342 
0.361719 
0.958658 
0.078294 
0.999989 
0.999999 
0.054601 
0.050426 
0.000008 
0.077362 
Average over 
non-CFA countries 
1970-1997 
1970-1986 
1992-1997 
0.677815 
0.009639 
0.062421 
0.457651 
0.009938 
0.072092 
0.264289 
0.009406 
0.076103 
0.140809 
0.078607 
0.103403 
0.442711 
0.009956 
0.066277 
0.002449 
0.001000 
0.173328 
0.999979 
0.999972 
0.068808 
0.005371 
0.000100 
0.107420 
Source: Computed by the author. 
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Table 10 presents the summary of the test for constant variances at quarterly data 
level. A major observation is that the tests that variances are constant at quarterly level is 
generally true at least when compared with the monthly data. Indeed most of the tests are 
significant at less than 10%. A few exceptions are noted such as the case of Nigeria in the 
pre-SAP period and Benin, Senegal, Togo and Nigeria in the post-SAP period. 
Surprisingly, unlike in the case of monthly data, tests on Ghana's estimates are highly 
significant. 
Table 10: Test for constant quarterly variances, 1970-1997 
Benin C6te 
d'lvoire 
Niger Senegal Togo Gambia Ghana Nigeria 
Average over 
ALL countries 
1970-1997 
1970-1986 
1992-1997 
0.031972 
0.019494 
0.094091 
0.000968 
0.012369 
0.063250 
0.000398 
0.000128 
0.052125 
0.002818 
0.003800 
0.114549 
0.005828 
0.069810 
0.086199 
0.008990 
0.000094 
0.010340 
0.006212 
0.007753 
0.041363 
0.000188 
0.639462 
0.063515 
Average over 
CFA countries 
1970-1997 
1970-1986 
1992-1997 
0.031972 
0.019494 
0.179593 
0.000968 
0.008022 
0.054422 
0.000398 
0.000128 
0.067972 
0.002818 
0.003800 
0.116764 
0.016306 
0.069810 
0.152546 
0.000000 
0.000000 
0.007156 
0.000000 
0.000000 
0.077666 
0.000045 
0.000000 
0.115245 
Average over 1970-1997 
non-CFA countries 1970-1986 
1992-1997 
0.000000 
0.000000 
0.039740 
0.000000 
0.023680 
0.101394 
0.000000 
0.000000 
0.032158 
0.000000 
0.000000 
0.044319 
0.000266 
0.000000 
0.062181 
0.008990 
0.000094 
0.025364 
0.006212 
0.007753 
0.041363 
0.000385 
0.639462 
0.031957 
Source: Computed by the author. 
The analysis of the test for the constant variances shows that the CFA zone, in general, 
was characterized by relatively constant variances. The result also shows that the variances 
tend to be more constant over the entire period, 1970-1997, compared with the results 
for the subperiods. Another noticeable pattern is that the variances of the CFA zone 
countries tended to be more constant in the pre-SAP period compared with post-SAP. In 
the case of non-CFA zone countries the pattern is reversed; constant variances were 
recorded in the post-SAP period, suggesting that the implementation of SAP brought 
about stability in real exchange rate shocks in this group of countries. 
Since the test for constant variances encompasses tests for independence of regressors 
and mis-specification test, our observation of constant variances also touches on exchange 
rate management, and macroeconomic policy management in general and inflation policy 
in particular. These factors no doubt have contributed to the observed significant 
differences between the CFA zone countries and their non-CFA zone counterparts. These 
factors might also be responsible for changes in the constancy of the variances of RER 
shocks in the CFA and non-CFA zones over the pre- and post-SAP periods. 
5. Costs and benefits of a single monetary 
zone in West Africa 
While the preceding analysis pointed to a more viable monetary union among ECOWAS now than before, the rest of the analysis focuses on potential benefits and costs of such a union. Three indicators of costs and benefits are 
examined. The first indicator, on the benefit side, is reduced exchange rate risk, which 
has potential for increasing intra-regional trade and investment. The others are on the 
negative side: loss of tax revenue on the intra-regional trade and loss of seigniorage. 
The concept of compensable trade or payment is used in the measurement of the 
potential benefits from the reduced exchange rate risk. The method involves comparison 
of total intra-regional trade that did not require the use of foreign exchange with total 
value of intra-regional trade. The method involves comparison of levels of intra-regional 
trade that are settled using the facilities of WAMA. For the purpose of calculating the 
potential effects of reduced exchange rate risk, total transactions that passed through the 
West African Monetary Agency are distinguished from those that were actually settled 
using the net balances of trading countries as opposed to those settled in foreign currencies. 
Table 2 showed that a very small proportion of the value of intra-regional trade that 
passed through the WAMA was cleared. A substantial number of transactions involved 
the use of foreign exchange. More importantly, only a small fraction of intra-ECOWAS 
trade was channelled through the Agency. An effective monetary arrangement has the 
potential of saving the foreign exchange currently being used in the intra-regional 
transactions. The table also revealed that since 1985, settlement in foreign exchange has 
dominated rather than clearing of net balances, which was at its peak in 1984. Even in 
the pre-1985 era, clearing of net balances accounted for, at best, about 25% of transactions 
that passed through the Agency. The table also shows that the ratio of intra-regional 
trade to total trade cleared through the agency has declined since 1985, and by 1996 the 
ratio was less than 1 %. The effect of exchange rate regimes was captured by this trend. 
The clearing house was established during highly restrictive exchange rate regimes. By 
the late 1980s, however, most of the economies in the region had embraced trade, exchange 
and payment liberalization. The implication is that an effective monetary union will be 
beneficial in terms of conserving foreign exchange, since an insignificant proportion of 
the current intra-regional trade was cleared through net balances of accounts. 
It should be noted that not all the proportion of intra-regional trade that is settled 
through foreign exchange could be attributed to the exchange rate risk, as other factors 
came into play in denominating intra-regional trade in third-country currencies. It is 
assumed that exchange rate risk is an important factor in the valuation of the intra-regional 
trade. More importantly, implementation of regional programmes, especially in the area 
of infrastructure such as transportation and telecommunication, will go a long way in 
complementing a regional monetary arrangement. 
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The loss of the use of monetary and exchange rate policies was estimated by calculating 
seigniorage. Our approach follows that of the World Bank (1994), where seigniorage is 
determined as: 
(M1 t-M 11_,)/GDP-gt(M 1 / GDP) t (7) 
where Ml 1 9 is the stock of money at the end of period t, GDP t is gross domestic 
product at time t and g t is the real GDP growth. This implies that seigniorage measures 
the inflationary impact of money creation. Equation 8 was estimated for eight West 
African countries20 (four each from CFA and non-CFA zones). 
Table 11 shows that seigniorage has been declining. Apart from confirming World 
Bank (1994), it is noted that there is a clear distinction between seigniorage in the CFA 
zone countries and that in their counterpart in the non-CFA zone. CFA zone countries 
are less dependent on seigniorage as a policy tool. More importantly, the level of 
seigniorage in these countries has continued to decrease. As shown in the table, all CFA 
zone countries achieved significant reduction in the level of seigniorage. Only The Gambia 
in the set of non-CFA zone countries achieved a comparable reduction in dependence on 
this policy handle. The use of inflation tax increased in Nigeria and slightly in Sierra 
Leone. It decreased only slightly in Ghana. The table also suggests that the non-CFA 
countries are yet to achieve the level of seigniorage achieved by the CFA zone countries 
in the pre-SAP era. 
Still on the cost side, the loss of tax revenue was calculated as the percentage share of 
taxes on international trade in government revenue. This shows the importance of this 
source of revenue to the government and hence what will be lost to the regional body 
when monetary union is established. 
Table 11: Seigniorage* in West Africa, percentage of GDP 
1970--1985: Pre-SAP 1986-1994: Post-SAP 
Non-CFA zone countries 
Gambia 2.63 1.41 
Ghana 4.35 3.26 
Nigeria 2.19 4.22 
Sierra Leone 3.67 3.97 
CFA zone countries 
Cote d'lvoire 2.52 0.33 
Niger 1.44 0.11 
Senegal 2.30 0.39 
Togo 2.67 -0.23 
* See footnote 5. 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Table 12 shows that the ratio of revenue from taxes on international trade to total 
government revenue is high for most of the selected countries, at between 12 and 44%. 
Nigeria and Mali recorded the lowest share of this type of revenue. Nigeria's low rate is 
largely due to its heavy dependence on oil revenue. Mali's low rate is attributable to its 
landlocked nature. Unlike the case of SDs of RER shocks and seigniorage, where there 
are marked differences between CFA and non-CFA zones countries, revenue from taxes 
on international trade is a significant factor that cuts across the CFA zone divides. 
Table 12: Share of revenues from taxes on international trade in government revenues for 
selected West African countries (%) 
1972 1987 1989 1990 
CFA zone countries 
Mali 28.1 12.0 12.0 
Burkina Faso 51.8 38.9 39.4 
Togo 32.3 32.3 45.2 
Non-CFA zone countries 
Sierra Leone 42.4 24.7 44.6 44.6 
Nigeria 17.5 6.6 16.4 
Ghana 40.6 42.5 35.2 35.2 
Liberia 31.6 26.9 34.6 34.6 
Source: Author's calculation. 
The dependence of West African countries on this type of tax for government revenue 
is an indication of poor tax management systems. Taxes on international trade are easier 
to administer than other types of taxes, but heavy dependence on trade taxes has its 
costs. It creates informal trade and distorts natural comparative advantages among other 
effects. Thus, reliance on taxes on international trade accounts for the high level of 
unrecorded trans-border trade in the region. Perhaps it is time for these countries to look 
to other type of taxes. 
6. Summary and policy recommendations 
This paper evaluated the viability of a single monetary zone in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) within the context of the theory of optimum currency area (OCA). An attempt was made to summarize all the 
postulates of OCA under real exchange rate (RER) shocks. Very low RER shocks that 
are comparable to those of other countries are essential for a stable monetary union. The 
RER shocks for CFA zone West African countries were used as the benchmark. Thus, an 
RER model was developed and applied to both monthly and quarterly data of some West 
African countries. The paper also examined the cost and benefits of a single monetary 
zone to the region. 
Summary 
Both the monthly and the quarterly data showed that the SDs of RER shocks of countries in West Africa have been declining over time. The model also suggested 
that the implementation of structural adjustment programmes has had a positive impact 
on the development of the RER shocks in the region. The wide differences in the pre-
and post-SAP results are some of the indicators of this observed pattern. 
There are still wide differences between the SDs of RER shocks of CFA zone West 
African countries and their non-CFA zone counterparts. The analysis revealed that 
historically CFA zone West African countries have been characterized by low SDs of 
RER shocks and that there are no wide variations among these countries on this ground. 
The opposite holds in the case of non-CFA zone countries. They are, historically, 
characterized by high SDs of RER shocks and they are not homogeneous on this count 
(i.e., there are wide variations among countries in this group). 
It was noted that the changes in the SDs of RER shocks in CFA zone countries were 
relatively small compared with the corresponding changes in the SDs of RER shocks in 
the non-CFA zone countries. Thus the non-CFA zone countries achieved a relatively 
higher reduction in the SDs of RER shocks in the post-SAP era compared with the 
development in the CFA zone countries. Notwithstanding this substantial reduction in 
the SDs of RER shocks by the non-CFA zone countries in West Africa, the SDs of RER 
shocks of these countries are still higher than those of the CFA countries in the post-SAP 
era. 
The wide variations in the SDs of RER shocks of non-CFA zone countries in the 
region ruled out the possibility of a viable two-speed monetary union unless drastic 
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policy reforms and strong political commitments are in place. In the absence of these 
prerequisites, piecemeal ascension to the existing region may be an economically viable 
option. If this is politically feasible then the analysis in this paper showed that only The 
Gambia out of the selected non-CFA zone West African countries is close to the 
development of the CFA zone countries. Thus only The Gambia is ready to join the CFA 
zone without much further reform and without exhibiting significant instability to the zone. 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, West African countries are closer to forming a single 
monetary union now than before. 
On the costs and benefits of a monetary union to the region, the analysis showed that 
there are significant potential benefits. Significant savings on foreign exchange will likely 
be realized as a result of reduced exchange rate risk. Increased intra-regional trade and 
investments are other potential benefits.The benefits come at the cost of loss of seigniorage, 
however, as well as loss of revenue from taxes on intra-regional trade. 
On seigniorage, a clear CFA and non-CFA zone pattern emerged just as in the case of 
SDs of RER shocks. The results showed that CFA zone countries' dependence on 
seigniorage is less than that of non-CFA countries. Pre- and post-SAP analyses showed 
that CFA countries also reduced their dependence on seigniorage in the post-SAP era. 
Seigniorage was not only high among the non-CFA zone West African countries, but it 
also witnessed a marginal change over the pre-SAP era. Indeed, there were slight increases 
in the use of seigniorage in Nigeria and Sierra Leone. As noted earlier, a necessary 
condition for seigniorage not standing as a stumbling block for the establishment of a 
viable monetary zone is its equitable allocation. Therefore, unless a firm allocation rule 
is in place, and members agree and establish a credible rule to ensure that deficits will 
not be monetized, the loss of seigniorage will continue to be a hindrance to the 
establishment of a monetary union in the subregion. 
Policy implications 
The findings of this study present ECOWAS with some policy options on the future of the monetary integration arrangement. In order to appreciate the policy options a 
general perception of the effects of exchange rate variability on trade is outlined. The 
analysis of RER shocks, especially in the context of a regional monetary arrangement, is 
incomplete without alluding to the possible effects of exchange rate variability (volatility) 
on trade. Theoretically, an increase in exchange rate volatility should be a hindrance to 
trade flows. However, various empirical analyses showed that the effects of exchange 
rate volatility on trade (and on virtually any macroeconomic aggregates) are ambiguous. 
This difference between theoretical postulates and empirical findings has been termed 
the exchange rate disconnect puzzle (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). Even where evidence 
points to negative effects of exchange rate volatility on trade, such effects are usually 
weak except in the long run. 
While not providing empirical evidence on the exchange rate volatility/trade 
relationship, this paper's position is clear: as long as exchange rate volatility affects 
transaction costs, and adjustment to such cost is neither free nor automatic, trade flows 
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will be negatively affected. Most of the plausible explanations for a weak relationship 
between exchange rate volatility and trade may not hold in the case of the West Africa of 
today. The usual risk analysis within the context of full information or forward markets 
is not tenable in the region for many reasons. Firms in the region are not in possession of 
full information, nor is a forward exchange rate market developed. Even if forward markets 
are developed they come with costs and more so are not likely to be perfect substitutes 
for spot markets. In summary, hedging instruments are not only underdeveloped in the 
region, but they also entail exorbitant costs. By implication, a single monetary zone in 
the region is capable of minimizing costs of transactions and therefore would promote 
intra-regional trade. 
Thus, irrespective of empirical findings on the effects of exchange rate variability on 
trade and other macroeconomic variables, there is potential for a single monetary zone to 
positively affect intra-regional trade in West Africa. 
On the basis of the findings of this study, the regional body should decide on and 
implement the necessary policy reform. There seems to be no shortcut to harmonization 
and coordination of policies necessary for the pursuance of a single monetary zone in the 
region. The implementation of SAPs by different countries in the region, though not 
coordinated at regional level, has been shown to positively affect the conditions for the 
formation of a single monetary zone in the region. There is no doubt that coordination at 
regional level would have enhanced the conditions for establishing regional currency. 
While there is no doubt that the region is closer to forming a region-wide monetary zone 
now than before, there is also need for further reform before a single monetary zone can 
be viable in the region. 
In the immediate, the decision on a one- or two-speed monetary zone will inform the 
type of reform that is required. If a single monetary zone is favoured, then substantial 
policy reform is needed in the non-CFA zone West African countries to support a stable 
and viable single monetary zone in the region. This is informed by the wide differences 
in the RER shocks between the CFA zone West African countries and their counterpart 
non-CFA zone countries. A two-speed regional monetary zone is not supported by the 
analysis. To achieve a two-speed regional monetary zone, the non-CFA zone countries 
would have to harmonize their policies to a level that could sustain a viable monetary 
zone among them. As the analysis revealed, the RER shocks in non-CFA countries varied 
widely. The possible option of a piecemeal approach to a region-wide monetary zone 
was supported by the analysis in this study. For example, The Gambia is a better candidate 
for a single monetary zone with the CFA zone countries than Ghana. Furthermore, since 
the CFA zone, which exhibited characteristics of a monetary union, is not yet a perfect 
monetary union, further convergence of policies is required at all levels. 
The expected net benefits accruing to trade from a regional currency arrangement are 
usually unevenly distributed among the member states. According to the theory of 
optimum currency areas (OCA), countries that are characterized by a high share of 
manufactures, diversified production structures, high flexible factor markets and flexible 
fiscal policy, among other factors, are likely to benefit more than other groups of countries. 
Since RER shocks are assumed to summarize these factors, the implication is that CFA 
zone countries and Nigeria are the potential high beneficiaries of a single monetary zone 
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in the region. Apart from this, Nigeria is likely to benefit from a regional arrangement 
more than other countries given its population and other characteristics. The implication 
of this for a viable and sustainable regional monetary arrangement is the importance of a 
regional redistribution policy that takes care of the relatively less developed countries. 
Finally, the analysis showed that dependence on revenue from tax on international 
iransactions was high and in some cases accounted for about 50% of government recurrent 
revenue. This is common to all the groups in the region. Thus, for a viable and stable 
monetary union in the region, alternatives to revenue from taxes on intra-regional must 
be sought. 
Notes 
1 See Vanguard Newspaper of Tuesday, 10 March 1998, for details. 
2 An estimate puts the level of UTT at several multiples of the official intra-regional 
trade (ECOWAS, 1980). 
3 Prior to 1 January 1999, the CFA franc was pegged to the French franc. Before 
1994, the rate was CFAF50 to one French franc. It was devalued in 1994 by 50%. 
4 Convergence of a group of economies can be measured in many ways, including 
s-convergence and b-convergence. 
s-convergence is achieved when the dispersion of cross-sectional income levels 
diminishes over time. This can occur in various ways. First, the growth of the 
early starters may be declining while the late starters begin to degenerate with 
them. Second, it is not impossible for the early starters to be degenerating faster 
than the rate at which others are declining. Other measures of convergence include 
b-convergence. This occurs when the b-coefficient of the cross-section regression 
of growth rates on initial levels of GDP per capita is negative. Thus those countries 
whose per capita income was below average for all countries at the beginning of 
the period should have higher average growth rate subsequently. For our purpose, 
the concept of s-convergence was adopted. The dispersion is measured by standard 
deviation of per capita income. 
5 Clearing, where instruments are traded, rather than settlement, where hard 
currencies are exchanged, is ideal for achieving the objectives of savings in the 
use of foreign exchange. 
6 Article X establishing WACH listed the following objectives: To promote the use 
of the currencies of the members of the clearing house for subregional trade and 
other transactions; to bring about savings in the use of foreign reserves of the 
members of the clearing house; to encourage the members of the clearing house to 
liberalize trade among their respective countries; and to promote monetary 
cooperation and consultation among the members of the clearing house. 
7 Chipeta and Mkandawire (1994) identified five stages/models of monetary 
integration as: limited currency convertibility; the European Monetary System 
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(EMS); parallel union currency; single common currency; and full economic and 
monetary union. Taylor (1994) identified a single currency system, partial monetary 
union and limited convertibility arrangement. Similarly, McLenaghan et al. (1982) 
identified a convertibility arrangement, a partial monetary union and a full monetary 
union. 
g The Cobham and Robson (1992) approach is cast along the degree of formalization 
involved. That is, whether the exchange rate is informal or formal prior to full 
monetary union. Eight characteristics of monetary integration were used in 
distinguishing among informal exchange rate union, formal exchange rate union 
and full monetary union. These characteristics are further grouped into two: those 
measures between member states such as: (a) current account convertibility, (b) 
capital market integration, (c) exchange rate fixity, and (d) ex-ante credibility of 
parities, and others, which are (e) types of currencies, (f) single/common/several 
central banks, (g) reserve pooling and (h) mode of foreign exchange market 
intervention. 
9 Recently there have been attempts to formalize the traditional OCA literature, i.e., 
quantifying and developing a formal model that encompasses all the various 
postulates. 
10 Of course, country level analysis is important for designing redistribution of gains 
from forming a monetary union in case there are uneven net cost-benefit to 
individual cooperating countries. 
11 There can be other reasons, apart from economic ones, for forming a monetary 
union of which political reason is one. These other reasons are captured by the 
analysis being attempted in this study. 
2 For more on recent developments and general discussions in this area see Tavlas 
(1994). 
3 The process of de-seasonalizing the data before estimating is capable of destroying 
the underlying properties of the data. An alternative to this two-stage procedure is 
to estimate the autoregressive model together with seasonal components at once. 
This was attempted and both approaches yielded a similar result. Indeed, the 
correlation coefficient between the residuals generated from the two models is 
0.98. The line graphs for the residuals are similar. Hence we stick to the two-stage 
procedure. 
It is easier to determine the pre-SAP period than the post-SAP period because 
while some countries adopted SAP measures in the early 1980s, some did not 
until the middle to late 1980s. Our definition of the SAP period is in line with 
World Bank (1994) definition of 1987 to 1991. 
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15 Some transformations were also carried out such as converting the nominal local 
currency/US dollar exchange rates to bilateral ones. 
16 This is the World Bank classification of adjustment periods. 
17 White's test for heteroscedasticity is a test of the null hypothesis of no 
heteroscedasticity (or that the variance is constant). The test is asymptotically 
distributed as a chi-squared. It should be noted that the test also passes for a general 
test of model mis-specification. 
18 Geometric means were calculated for non-zero marginal significant levels and 
average over different groups of countries in the sample for different models 
differentiated by the sample periods. 
19 Ml is the narrow definition of money. It is the summation of demand deposits and 
currency outside banks. 
20 The sample was based purely on availability of data and not on any other 
consideration. 
21 Of course, the most appropriate data in this context are intra-regional trade, which 
are not available. The data used also point to the fact that intra-regional trade is 
likely to be small, hence the lost revenue from taxes on intra-regional trade that 
will be reduced to zero when a single monetary zone is established is expected to 
be very small. 
22 The piecemeal approach also helps in gradual expansion and strengthening of 
required institutions. A decision to join or not should rest with the individual 
country in order to ensure the effective implementation of the regional programme. 
A piecemeal approach also enables a country to plan its accession carefully, 
marshalling the expected benefits and adequately preparing for the costs. 
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Appendix: Supplementary data 
Table A1: Summary statistics for RER shocks for ECOWAS, 1970-1997 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1. Benin-Cote d'lvoire RRBC -0.0038344 0.037428 -0.15352 0.13064 
2. Benin-Niger RRBN -0.0004262 0.042949 -0.16658 0.11829 
3. Benin-Senegal RRBS -0.0024245 0.039410 -015287 0.12929 
4. Benin-Togo RRBT -0.0015217 0.029410 -0.17404 0.12376 
5. Cote d'lvoire-Niger RRCN 0.0021595 0.030262 -0.12760 0.15725 
6. Cote d'lvoire-Togo RRCT 0.0016227 0.025880 -0.10500 0.099611 
7, Niger-Senegal RRNS -0.0008587 0.030932 -0.16834 0.12298 
8. Niger-Togo RRNT -0.0008776 0.031431 -0.15828 0.12299 
9. Senegal-Togo RRST 0.0003940 0.028605 -0.90728 0.10227 
10. Cote d'lvoire-Senegal RRCS 0.0010171 0.026730 -0.095220 0.13012 
11. Benin-Gambia RRBG -0.0045131 0.076394 -0.52149 0.66671 
12. Benin-Ghana RRBH -0.039702 0.21643 -2.32725 0.42208 
13. Benin-Nigeria RRBA -0.016516 0.11561 -0.80028 0.49275 
14. Cote d'lvoire-Gambia RRCG -0.0030255 0.067014 -0,50933 0.67912 
15. Cote d'lvoire-Ghana RRCH -0.037928 0.20973 -2.35176 0.40379 
16. Cote d'lvoire-Nigeria RRCA -0.014675 0.10754 -0.79396 0.51298 
17. Gambia-Niger RRGN 0.0037468 0.070247 -0.64173 0.49757 
18. Gambia-Senegal RRGS 0.0036535 0.070782 -0.71830 0.50378 
19. Gambia-Togo RRGT 0.0035917 0.068663 -0.63794 0.52496 
20. Ghana-Niger RRHN 0.039047 0.21213 -0.40455 2.28690 
21. Ghana-Senegal RRHS 0.039020 0.21353 -0.41404 2.33775 
22. Ghana-Togo RRHT 0.038148 0.21272 -0.38937 2.36528 
23. Niger-Nigeria RRNA -0.014525 0.11165 -0.79099 0.47853 
24. Nigeria-Senegal RRAS 0.014918 0.11157 -0.55556 0.77991 
25. Nigeria-Togo RRAT 0.015170 0.10997 -0.47314 0.79281 
26. Gambia-Ghana RRGH -0.033117 0.19650 -2.33295 0.40219 
27. Gambia-Nigeria RRGA -0.012789 0.0911301 -0.68974 0.28833 
RESEARCH PAPER 147 
0.86173 2.35564 
Table A2: Summary statistics for RER shocks for ECOWAS, 1970-1986 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1. Benin-Cote d'lvoire RRBC -0.0023196 0.045577 -0.15352 0.13064 
2. Benin-Niger RRBN -0.0045525 0.051128 -0.16658 0.11829 
3. Benin-Senegal RRBS -0.0022732 0.047121 -0.15287 0.12929 
4. Benin-Togo RRBT -0.0012305 0.047314 -0.17404 0.12376 
5. Cote d'lvoire-Niger RRCN 0.00090410 0.035800 -0.12760 0.15725 
6. Cote d'lvoire-Togo RRCT 0.00086979 0.029764 -0.10500 0.099611 
7. Niger-Senegal RRNS 0.000068585 0.035746 -0.16834 0.12298 
8. Niger-Togo RRNT 0.0014832 0.036354 -0.15828 0.12299 
9. Senegal-Togo RRST 0.00048442 0.033122 -0.90728 0.10227 
10. Cote d'lvoire-Senegal RRCS -0010838 0.031587 -0.095220 0.13012 
11. Benin-Gambia RRBG -0.0038628 0.078329 -0.52149 0.27037 
12. Benin-Ghana RRBH -0.040105 0.24947 -2.32725 0.42208 
13. Benin-Nigeria RRBA -0.012729 0.10888 -0.80028 0.15692 
14. Cote d'lvoire-Gambia RRCG -0.0022419 0.063763 -0.050933 0.23816 
15. Cote d'lvoire-Ghana RRCH -0.038364 0.24278 -2.35176 0.40379 
16. Cote d'lvoire-Nigeria RRCA -0.010853 0.098008 -0.79396 0.15516 
17. Gambia-Niger RRGN 0.0031342 0.069123 -0.27147 0.49757 
18. Gambia-Senegal RRGS 0.0024349 0.066795 -0.26967 0.50378 
19. Gambia-Togo RRGT 0.0029292 0.067549 -0.26967 0.50378 
20. Ghana-Niger RRHN 0.039667 0.24462 -0.40455 2.28690 
21. Ghana-Senegal RRHS 0.038928 0.24611 -0.41404 2.33775 
22. Ghana-Togo RRHT 0.038606 0.24456 -0.38937 2.36528 
23. Niger-Nigeria RRNA -0.011064 0.10401 -0.79099 0.12660 
24. Nigeria-Senegal RRAS 0.010810 0.10056 -0.14770 0.77991 
25. Nigeria-Togo. RRAT 0.011531 0.099023 -0.13877 0.79281 
26. Gambia-Ghana RRGH -0.030527 0.22679 -2.33295 0.40219 
27. Gambia-Nigeria RRGA -0.00491 0.085667 -0.68974 0.28833 
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28. Ghana-Nigeria RRHA 0.021215 0.18461 
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28. Ghana-Nigeria RRHA 0.024151 0.22145 -0.86173 
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Table A3: Summary statistics for RER shocks ECOWAS, 1987-1991 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1. Benin-Cote d'lvoire RRBC -0.0052141 0.019942 -0.055128 0.031027 
2. Benin-Niger RRBN 0.0076298 0.028683 -0.047686 0.094242 
3. Benin-Senegal RRBS -0.00017633 0.024913 -0.043818 0.044769 
4. Benin-Togo RRBT 0.0036145 0.025617 -0.056264 0.059266 
5. Cote d'lvoire-Niger RRCN 0.0066349 0.019103 -0.033847 0.075478 
6. Cote d'lvoire-Togo RRCT 0.0037461 0.017897 -0.071215 0.049369 
7. Niger-Senegal RRNS -0.0024711 0.022440 -0.075110 0.43742 
8. Niger-Togo RRNT -0.0051209 0.025752 -0.073510 0.058849 
9. Senegal-Togo RRST 0.00099487 0.019761 -0.049148 0.048875 
10. Cote d'lvoire-Senegal RRCS 0.0048062 0.016031 -0.036472 0.038783 
11. Benin-Gambia RRBG -0.015429 0.047433 -0.13646 0.075369 
12. Benin-Ghana RRBH -0.046977 0.17020 -0.60068 0.12837 
13. Benin-Nigeria RRBA -0.031183 0.13084 -0.63983 0.26288 
14. Cote d'lvoire-Gambia RRCG -0.013569 0.044477 -0.14623 0.079820 
15. Cote d'lvoire-Ghana RRCH -0.045300 0.16252 -0.57956 0.096556 
16. Cote d'lvoire-Nigeria RRCA -0.029371 0.12444 -0.58524 0.25769 
17. Gambia-Niger RRGN 0.013904 0.051262 -0.085493 0.18035 
18. Gambia-Senegal RRGS 0.015374 0.047482 -0.080408 0.17349 
19. Gambia-Togo RRGT 0.013843 0.045880 -0.072805 0.16793 
20. Ghana-Niger RRHN 0.047929 0.16507 -0.13031 0.58158 
21. Ghana-Senegal RRHS 0.048447 0.16581 -0.11566 0.61951 
22. Ghana-Togo RRHT 0.045938 0.16599 -0.095315 0.60110 
23. Niger-Nigeria RRNA -0.028793 0.12727 -0.25110 0.59926 
24. Nigeria-Senegal RRAS 0.030332 0.12885 -0.25110 0.59926 
25. Nigeria-Togo RRAT 0.029820 0.12977 -0.25495 0.61292 
26. Gambia-Ghana RRGH -0.031257 0.14649 -0.50987 0.10473 
27. Gambia-Nigeria RRGA -0.026173 0.10794 -0.52684 0.24841 
28. Ghana-Nigeria RRHA 0.017287 0.10509 -0.14976 0.54267 
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Table A4: Summary statistics for RER shocks for ECOWAS, 1992-1997 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1. Benin-Cote d'lvoire RRBC -0.0067874 0.020224 -0.64618 0.040066 
2. Benin-Niger RRBN 0.0040361 0.022841 -0.082873 0.047932 
3. Benin-Senegal RRBS -0.0047077 0.023271 -0.072570 0.060092 
4. Benin-Togo RRBT -0.0065904 0.020510 -0.084090 0.035564 
5. Cote d'lvoire-Niger RRCN 0.0018302 0.019450 -0.081149 0.056297 
6. Cote d'lvoire-Togo RRCT 0.0018925 0.019570 -0.079318 0.044222 
7. Niger-Senegal RRNS -0.0020265 0.021846 -0.084266 0.053281 
8. Niger-Togo RRNT -0.0037354 0.018301 -0.046855 0.068236 
9. Senegal-Togo RRST -0.0003513 0.020833 -0.057137 0.086769 
10. Cote d'lvoire-Senegal RRCS 0.0035493 0.017615 -0.0433314 0.059556 
11. Benin-Gambia RRBG 0.0028223 0.089476 -0.13169 0.66671 
12. Benin-Ghana RRBH -0.032546 0.14444 -0.65107 0.14372 
13. Benin-Nigeria RRBA -0.014552 0.12052 -0.56565 0.49275 
14. Cote d'lvoire-Gambia RRCG 0.0036385 0.087899 -0.0841126 0.67912 
15. Cote d'lvoire-Ghana RRCH -0.030602 0.13735 -0.61102 0.16336 
16. Cote d'lvoire-Nigeria RRCA -0.012778 0.11731 -0.57185 0.51298 
17. Gambia-Niger RRGN -0.0030589 0.085344 -0.64173 0.11240 
18. Gambia-Senegal RRGS -0.0028131 0.093687 -0.71830 0.12888 
19. Gambia-Togo RRGT -0.0031568 0.085406 -0.63794 0.12848 
20. Ghana-Niger RRHN 0.029967 0.14255 -0.16261 0.61726 
21. Ghana-Senegal RRHS 0.031416 0.14448 -0.21375 0.62196 
22. Ghana-Togo RRHT 0.030417 0.14607 -0.16156 0.65475 
23. Niger-Nigeria RRNA -0.012006 0.11834 -0.55113 0.47853 
24. Nigeria-Senegal RRAS 0.0133200 0.12439 -0.55556 0.56352 
25. Nigeria-Togo RRAT 0.012815 0.12047 -0.47314 0.57395 
26. Gambia-Ghana RRGH -0.041680 0.13721 -0.54142 0.11327 
27. Gambia-Nigeria RRGA -0.022953 0.090078 -0.51089 0.099170 
28. Ghana-Nigeria RRHA 0.016536 0.11509 -0.55029 0.35952 
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Figure A1: Monthly bilateral RER variations: First quarter 1970-Last quarter, 1997 
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Figure A1 (Continued) 
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Figure A2: Quarterly bilateral RER variations: First quarter 1970- Last quarter, 1997 
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Figure A2 (Continued) 
AIM EVALUATION OF THE VIABILITY OF A SINGLE MONETARY ZONE IN E C O W A S 5 1 
Other recent publications in the AERC Research Papers Series: 
The Behaviour of Income Velocity in Tanzania 1967-1994, by Michael O.A. Ndanshau, Research Paper 
50. 
Consequences and Limitations of Recent Fiscal Policy in Cote d'lvoire, by Kouassy Oussou and Bohoun 
Bouabre, Research Paper 51. 
Effects of Inflation on Ivorian Fiscal Variables: An Econometric Investigation, by Eugene Kouassi, 
Research Paper 52. 
European Economic Integration and the Franc Zone: The Future of the CFA Franc after 1999, Part II, 
by Allechi M'Bet and Niamkey A, Madeleine, Research Paper 53. 
Exchange Rate Policy and Economic Reform in Ethiopia, by Asmerom Kidane, Research Paper 54. 
The Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market: Possibilities for Convergence in Exchange Rates, by P. Kassey 
Garba, Research Paper 55. 
Mobilizing Domestic Resources for Economic Development in Nigeria: The Role of the Capital Market, 
by Fidelis O. Ogwumike and Davidson A. Omole, Research Paper 56. 
Policy Modelling in Agriculture: Testing the Response of Agriculture to Adjustment Policies in Nigeria, 
by Mike Kwanashie, Abdul-Ganiyu Garba and Isaac Ajilima, Research Paper 57. 
Price and Exchange Rate Dynamics in Kenya: An Empirical Investigation (1970—1993), by Njuguna S. 
Ndung'u, Research Paper 58. 
Exchange Rate Policy and Inflation: The Case of Uganda, by Barbara Mbire, Research Paper 59. 
Institutional, Traditional and Asset Pricing Characteristics of African Emerging Capital Markets, by Ino 
L. Inanga and Chidozie Emenuga, Research Paper 60. 
Foreign Aid and Economic Performance in Tanzania, by Timothy S. Nyoni, Research Paper 61. 
Public Spending, Taxation and Deficits: What Is the Tanzatrian Evidence? by Nehemiah Osoro, 
Research Paper 62. 
Adjustment Programmes and Agricultural Incentives in Sudan: A Comparative Study, by Nasredin A. 
Hag Elamin and Elsheikh M. El Mak, Research Paper 63. 
Intra-industry Trade between Members of the PTA/COMESA Regional Trading Arrangement, by Flora 
Mndeme Musonda, Research Paper 64. 
Fiscal Operations, Money Supply and Inflation in Tanzania, by A.A.L. Kilindo, Research Paper 65. 
Growth and Foreign Debt: The Ugandan Experience, by Barbara Mbire, Research Paper 66. 
Productivity of the Nigerian Tax System: 1970-1990, by Ademola Ariyo, Research Paper 67. 
Potentials for Diversifying Nigeria's Non-oil Exports to Non-Traditional Markets, by A. Osuntogun, 
C.C. Edordu and B.O. Oramah, Research Paper 68. 
Empirical Studies of Nigeria's Foreign Exchange Parallel Market II: Speculative Efficiency and Noisy 
Trading, by Melvin Ayogu, Research Paper 69. 
Effects of Budget Deficits on the Current Account Balance in Nigeria: A Simulation Exercise, by Festus 
O. Egwaikhide, Research Paper 70. 
Bank Performance and Supervision in Nigeria: Analysing the Transition to a Deregulated Economy, by 
O.O. Sobodu and P.O. Akiode, Research Paper 71. 
Financial Sector Reforms and Interest Rate Liberalization: The Kenya Experience, by R.W. Ngugi and 
J.W. Kabubo, Research Paper 72. 
Local Government Fiscal Operations in Nigeria, by Akpan H. Ekpo and John E.U. Ndebbio, Research 
Paper 73. 
Tax Reform and Revenue Productivity in Ghana, by Newman Kwadwo Kusi, Research Paper 74. 
Fiscal and Monetary Burden of Tanzania's Corporate Bodies: The Case of Public Enterprises, by 
H.P.B. Moshi, Research Paper 75. 
Analysis of Factors Affecting the Development of an Emerging Capital Market: The Case of the Ghana 
Stock Market, by Kofi A. Osei, Research Paper 76. 
Ghana: Monetary Targeting and Economic Development, by Cletus K. Dordunoo and Alex Donkor, 
Research Paper 77. 
5 2 RESEARCH PAPER 1 4 7 
The Nigerian Economy; Response of Agriculture to Adjustment Policies, by Mike Kwanashie, Isaac 
Ajilima and Abdul-Ganiyu Garba, Research Paper 78. 
External Aid Inflows and the Real Exchange Rate in Ghana, by Hairy A. Sackey, Research Paper 110. 
Formal and Informal Intitutions'Lending Policies and Access to Credit by Small-Scale Enterprises in 
Kenya: An Empirical Assessment, by Rosemary Atieno, Research Paper 111. 
Financial Sector Reform Macroeconomic Instability and the Order of Economic Liberalization: The 
Evidence from Nigeria, by Sylvanus I. Ikhinda and Abayomi A. Alawode, Research Paper 112. 
The Second Economy and Tax Yield in Malawi, by C. Chipeta, Research Paper 113. 
Promoting Export Diversification in Cameroon: Toward Which Products! by Lydie T. Bamou, Research 
Paper 114. 
Asset Pricing and Information Efficiency of the Ghana Stock Market, by Kofi A. Osei, Research Paper 
115. 
An Examination of the Sources of Economic Growth in Cameroon, by Aloysius Ajab Amin, Research 
Paper 116. 
Trade Liberalization and Technology Acquisition in the Manufacturing Sector: Evidence from Nigeria, 
by Ayonrinde Folasade, Research Paper 117. 
Total Factor Productivity in Kenya: The Links with Trade Policy, by Joseph Onjala, Research Paper 118. 
Kenya Airways: A Case Study of Privatization, by Samuel Oyieke, Research Paper 119. 
Determinants of Agricultural Exports: The Case of Cameroon, by Daniel Gbetnkon and Sunday A. Khan, 
Research Paper 120. 
Determinants of Regional Poverty in Uganda, by Francis Okurut, Jonathan Odwee and Asaf Adebua, 
Research Paper 122 
Exchange Rate Policy and the Parallel Market for Foreign Currency in Burundi, by Janvier D. 
Nkurunziza, Research Paper 123. 
Structural Adjustment, Poverty and Economic Growth: An Analysis for Kenya, by Jane Kabubo-
Mariara and Tabitha W. Kiriti, Research Paper 124. 
Liberalization and Implicit Government Finances in Sierra Leone, by Victor A.B. Davis, Research Paper 
125. 
Productivity, Market Structure and Trade Liberalization in Nigeria, by Adeola F. Adenikinju and Louis 
N. Chete, Research Paper 126. 
Productivity Growth in Nigerian Manufacturing and Its Correlation to Trade Policy Regimes/Indexes 
(1962-1985), by Louis N. Chete and Adeola F. Adenikinju, Research Paper 127. 
Financial Liberalization and Its Implications for the Domestic Financial System: The Case of Uganda, 
by Louis A. Kasekende and Michael Atingi-Ego, Research Paper 128. 
Public Enterprise Reform in Nigeria: Evidence from the Telecommunications Industry, by Afeikhena 
Jerome, Research Paper 129. 
Food Security and Child Nutrition Status among Urban Poor Households in Uganda: Implications for 
Poverty Alleviation, by Sarah Nakabo-Sswanyana, Research Paper 130. 
Tax Reforms and Revenue Mobilization in Kenya, by Moses Kinyanjui Muriithi and Eliud Dismas Moyi, 
Research Paper 131. 
Wage Determination and the Gender Wage Gap in Kenya: Any Evidence of Gender Discrimination? by 
Jane Kabubo-Mariara, Research Paper 132. 
Trade Reform and Efficiency in Cameroon's Manufacturing Industries, by Ousmanou Njika, Research 
Paper 133. 
Efficiency of Microenterprise in the Nigerian Economy, by Igbekele A. Ajibefun and Adebiyi G. 
Daramola, Research Paper 134. 
The Impact of Foreign Aid on Public Expenditure: The Case of Kenya, by James Njeru, Research Paper 
135. 
The Effects of Trade Liberalization on Productive Efficiency: Electrical Industry in Cameroon, by 
Ousmanou Njikam, Research Paper 136. 
How Tied Aid Affects the Cost of Aid-Funded Projects in Ghana, by Barfour Osei, Research Paper 137. 
Exchange Rate Regimes and Inflation in Tanzania, by Longinus Rutasitara, Research Paper 138. 
Private Returns to Higher Education in Nigeria, by O.B.Okuwa, Research Paper 139. 
AIM EVALUATION OF THE VIABILITY OF A SINGLE MONETARY ZONE IN E C O W A S 5 3 
Uganda's Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate and Its Implications for Non-Traditional Export 
Performance, by Michael Atingi-Ego and Rachel Kaggwa Sebudde, Research Paper 140. 
liynamic Inter-Links among the Exchange Rate, Price Level and Terms of Trade in a Managed Floating 
Exchange Rate System; The Case of Ghana, by Vijay K. Bhasin, Research Paper 141. 
Financial Deepening, Economic Growth and Development: Evidence from Selected Sub-Saharan African 
Countries, by John E. Udo Ndebbio, Research Paper 142. 
The Determinants of Inflation in South Africa: An Econometric Analysis, by Oludele A. Akinboade 
Franz K. Siebrits and Elizabeth W. Niedermeier, Research Paper 143. 
The Cost of Aid Tying to Ghana, by Barfour Osei, Research Paper 144. 
A Positive and Normative Analysis of Bank Supervision in Nigeria, by Adedoyin Soyibo, S.O. Alashi and 
M.K. Ahmad, Research Paper 145. 
The Determinants of the Real Exchange Rate in Zambia, by Kombe O. Mungule, Research Paper 146 
AFRICAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH CONSORTIUM 
R C 
IEA 
P.O. B O X 62882 - 00200 
NAIROBI , KENYA 
T E L E P H O N E (254-20) 2734150 
2734153 2734157 2734163 
2734166 2734179 
FAX (254-20) 2734170 2734173 
E-MAIL: 
communicat ions@aercafr ica.org 
W E B SITE: 
http://www.aercafrica.org 
The principal objective of the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), established in August 1988, is to 
strengthen local capacity for conducting independent, rigorous 
inquiry into problems pertinent to the management of economies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
In response to special needs of the region, AERC has adopted a 
flexible approach to improve the technical skills of local researchers, 
allow for regional determination of research priorities, strengthen 
national institutions concerned with economic policy research, and 
facilitate closer ties between researchers and policy makers. 
Since its establishment, AERC has been supported by private 
foundations, bilateral aid agencies and international organizations. 
SPECIAL PAPERS contain the findings of commissioned 
studies in furtherance of AERC's programmes for research, training 
and capacity building. 
R E S E A R C H PAPERS contain the edited and externally 
reviewed results of research financed by the AERC. 
It is AERC's policy that authors of Special and Research papers 
are free to use material contained therein in other publications. Views 
expressed in such papers are those of the authors alone and should 
not be attributed to the AERC's sponsoring Members, Programme 
Committee, or Secretariat. 
Further information concerning the AERC, and additional copies 
of Special and Research Papers, can be obtained by writing to: African 
Economic Research Consortium, P.O. Box 62882 - 00200, Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
ISBN 9966-944-57-5 
